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Abstract 
In 2008, the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership was adopted to facilitate migration 
management between the European Union (EU) and the West African country of Cape Verde. 
This stands in the tradition of migration as an aspect of the EU external policy, and 
includes aspects of security, development and legal migration in one single ‗migration 
package‘. Frontex is tasked with the border management within this specific 
partnership, as the only EU-level agency participating. The purpose of this thesis is to 
study this policy instrument in order to understand the recent developments in the EU 
migration management policy, the nature of the partnership and how it contributes to 
the coordination of the overall migration management policy. Frontex has been 
criticized for being hostile towards human rights and for providing the so-called 
Fortress Europe. In order to investigate how this is manifested in the partnership, the 
very nature of the agency has been studied. The main finding in this thesis is that the 
mobility partnership contributes to the EU migration management policy through 
enhanced cooperation and interaction between the participating member states. 
Through rules, standard operating procedures and a shared understanding, the mobility 
partnership is on its way to become institutionalized. This process of 
institutionalization may indicate a change in the overall migration management policy 
contributing to a more coordinated EU migration policy. Frontex has contributed to 
feed the border management agenda into the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership, and 
this has been possible because of its organizational capacity.  
 
 
 
 
  
VI 
 
 
VII 
 
Acknowledgments 
The process of writing this thesis is difficult to describe with a few words…it has been 
incredibly challenging and frustrating, yet rewarding and at some times even fun. 
However, the final result would not have been the same without support from many 
helpful and kind people around me. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to 
my supervisor Dr Meng-Hsuan Chou. She has taught me a great deal about migration, 
the EU and the reality of doing research. Her research has been truly inspiring and 
when I have been frustrated she has helped me thinking clearly and pushed me further. 
I would also like to thank my informants who have patiently answered my questions 
and given me valuable insight to the European migration policy. They have shared 
experiences from their daily life that I could not have learned by reading documents. 
ARENA, Centre for European Studies also deserves my gratitude for supporting me 
with a student grant which, in particular, has made it possible to do my fieldwork in 
Brussels, and I am also grateful to Fritt Ord for supporting me with a scholarship. To 
Solveig, Anne Linn, Mads, Benedicte, Nina, Marianne and Guri at ARENA- without 
your support I do not know if this thesis would ever exist. A special thanks to Solveig 
for helping me with last minute editing. Thank you Anne Julie Semb. Thank you 
Mamma and Pappa for always letting me share my worries with you, for proof reading 
and for academic and moral support. Thank you lille Johannes- for giving me joy and 
happiness! At last, thank you Felipe for having supported me through many ups and 
downs. You have waited for me, you have supported me, and now- finally I am at the 
end of the journey, free to enjoy life! 
Any shortcomings or mistakes are my responsibility only 
 
Words: 31 620 
 
Ane Kristine Djupedal 
Oslo, 25 February 2011 
VIII 
 
 
IX 
 
Table of contents 
Chapter 1 ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 Why this study is important ......................................................................... 2 
1.2 European migration management policy .................................................................. 5 
1.2.1 Externalization of the EU migration policy .................................................. 6 
1.2.2 The migration-development nexus and security ....................................... 10 
1.3 The mobility partnerships........................................................................................... 11 
1.3.1 The EU-Cape Verde relationship .............................................................. 12 
1.3.2 The EU-Cape Verde partnership .............................................................. 14 
1.4 EU-Level agencies and Frontex ............................................................................... 15 
1.4.3 Frontex: The European border control agency ......................................... 16 
1.5 Organization of the thesis .......................................................................................... 18 
Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................. 19 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 19 
2.1.1 What am I studying? ................................................................................. 19 
2.2 A new institutional perspective ................................................................................. 21 
2.2.1 Rules, procedures and shared understanding .......................................... 21 
2.2.2 The coherence hypothesis ....................................................................... 23 
2.3 An organizational perspective ................................................................................... 23 
2.3.1 Organizational structure ........................................................................... 25 
2.4 Methodology and data ................................................................................................ 27 
2.4.1 Case study ............................................................................................... 28 
2.4.2 Data: interviews and primary documents .................................................. 30 
2.4.3 Semi-structured interviews ....................................................................... 30 
2.4.4 Documents ............................................................................................... 32 
2.5 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 33 
Chapter 3 ................................................................................................................. 35 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 35 
3.2 Mobility partnership: From a European perspective .............................................. 35 
3.2.1 Patterns of cooperation – on paper .......................................................... 36 
3.2.2 Patterns of cooperation – in practice ........................................................ 39 
3.2.3 Patterns of interactions ............................................................................. 46 
X 
 
3.3 An institutional perspective ........................................................................................ 47 
3.3.1 Patterns of cooperation ............................................................................ 47 
3.3.2 Patterns of interaction ............................................................................... 51 
3.3.3 Historical context ...................................................................................... 53 
3.4 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 54 
Chapter 4 ................................................................................................................. 57 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 57 
4. 2 Frontex in the mobility partnership .......................................................................... 58 
4.2.1 Frontex’ contribution to the partnership on paper ..................................... 59 
4.2.2 Frontex’ contribution to the partnership in practice ................................... 62 
4.3 An organizational perspective ................................................................................... 73 
4.3.1 Organizational structure ........................................................................... 73 
4.4 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 80 
Chapter 5 ................................................................................................................. 83 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 83 
5.2 Main findings ................................................................................................................ 84 
5.3 Dynamics in the EU migration management policy and theoretical implications
 .............................................................................................................................................. 87 
5.4 External validity and further research ...................................................................... 89 
References .............................................................................................................. 93 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................ 103 
Appendix B ............................................................................................................ 105 
 
 
  
XI 
 
Abbreviations 
 
CV Cape Verde 
DG Directorate- General  
DG AID Directorate-General Europe Aid Development and Cooperation 
DG DEV Directorate-General for Development 
DG JLS Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security 
DG Home Directorate-General for Home Affairs  
ETF The European Training Foundation  
EU The European Union  
FRONTEX The European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders 
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations 
HLWG High Level Working Group on Migration and Asylum 
JHA Justice and Home Affairs 
RAU Risk Analysis Unit 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Research purpose 
Migration has, since the very beginning of the European integration process, touched 
upon core issues of the developments in the Union as a result of implementing the four 
freedoms: Freedom of services, goods, capital and finally, of labour (Chou 2009b: 5; 
Givens and Luedtke 2004: 145). The European Union (EU)
1
 is an area of free 
movement of persons, asylum and migration, which signifies a Union without internal 
borders. This free movement of people within the EU became strengthened with the 
entry into force of the Schengen agreement in 1995
2
, and has contributed to a need for 
a common migration framework for the member states. This thesis offers an 
assessment of how EU migration management policy has evolved recently by looking 
at a very specific policy instrument, namely the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership.  
 
The overall aim is thus to take one step closer to understand what underpins the recent 
developments in the European migration policy operationalized through coordination. 
This coordination will be studied by taking at look at the above mentioned partnership 
followed by a study of the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) in order to investigate how Frontex 
contributes to the mobility partnership towards the overall objective of EU‘s migration 
management policy.  
 
                                                 
1
 The European Union came officially into existence with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, while the European 
Community (EC) was founded with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In order to prevent confusion throughout the 
thesis I will use the term EU or the European Union interchangeably even though I am referring to developments 
earlier than 1992.  
2
 The Schengen Agreement was signed with France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 
1985, however the implementation of the convention came about in 1995. With the Amsterdam agreement in 
1997 every country in the EU, except from the UK and Ireland, signed the treaty. In addition, Bulgaria, Romania 
and Cyprus are neither participants of the Schengen Agreement.  
2 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: The first part seeks to explain the importance of 
this study. Second, the developments in the European migration management policy 
will be outlined to show the context in which the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership 
was created, followed by a description of the EU-Cape Verde relationship and the 
mobility partnership. Next, I present the agency structure in the EU together with a 
description of Frontex, both its structure and functions according to its mandate. The 
presentation of the topics presented in this chapter leads, at the end of the chapter, to 
the two overarching research questions of this study related to a) the contribution of 
the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership to the EU migration policy b) Frontex and its 
contribution to the partnership. Finally, a brief outline of the structure of the master 
thesis ends the chapter 
 
1.1.1 Why this study is important 
The EU migration policy has undergone dramatic changes over the last few years, and 
by looking at the EU-Cape Verde partnership this thesis seeks to go in depth in the 
study of one policy instrument in order to see how it contributes to this policy. In the 
Tampere Council Conclusions from 1999 and the Communication of Circular 
Migration from 2007, the EU and the member states articulated common goals for the 
further development of the EU migration management policy. These events stand as 
the point of departure for asking how, if at all, the mobility partnership contributes to a 
change of the overall migration management policy.  
 
The study has been triggered by a curiosity to explore several issues, both analytically 
and empirically. In the Tampere Conclusions the ‗need for a more efficient 
management of migration flows at all their stages‘ was established in order to create a 
Union of Freedom, Security and Justice (European Parliament 1999: 5). The aim was a 
common EU policy, and this would be done through several measures linked to 
various aspects of the EU migration policy, and developing partnerships with third 
countries was launched as one of those measures. The objectives of the partnerships 
with third countries were ‗assessment of countries and regions of origin and transit in 
order to formulate specific integrated approaches‘ (European Commission 2000: 8). 
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Seven years later, the Commission wrote in ‗the Communication on circular migration 
and mobility partnerships‘ that the contribution of the partnerships would be in the 
form of coordination, assessment and formulation of policy. The aim of the 
partnerships was to facilitate legal movements between third countries and the EU 
member states. The objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which the 
Commission and the member states have reached the aim of increased coordination in 
order to maximize synergy, and in a Commission evaluation of the Mobility 
Partnerships it was stated that the partnerships were contributing to the 
operationalization of the Global Approach to Migration:  
 
[E]ven at this early stage of the implementation, mobility partnerships 
constitute the most innovative and sophisticated tool to date of the Global 
Approach to Migration and contribute significantly to its operationalisation 
(European Commission 2009: 4) 
 
However, when policy makers are evaluating and measuring the effectiveness of its 
own policy this might be used as political ammunition in order to justify the specific 
policy under study (Christensen et al. 2009: 174), and thus it is interesting to 
investigate the claims in this Commission report further. The mobility partnership is a 
recent phenomenon in the European migration management policy, and has not yet 
been explored in depth. It is a policy instrument set out by the Commission and the EU 
member states in order to put policy into practice, and although it has been claimed 
that these partnerships are not new to the EU migration cooperation (Chou and Gibert 
2010: 12), my expectation is that they, in some way, are contributing to a change in the 
European integration process by being a framework for enhancing the coordination 
between the EU member states and the EU. So, the question is; how does the EU-Cape 
Verde mobility partnership actually contribute to a change of the overall migration 
management policy? According to the organizational and institutional theories, 
political structures create boundaries, rules and procedures (Olsen 2009), and by using 
institutional theory it is possible to investigate how institutions affect political 
4 
 
outcomes. In this thesis institutional theory will be applied in order to investigate 
change and continuity in the EU migration management policy. 
 
Given that the partnership contributes to a change to the migration management 
policy, it is interesting to investigate how Frontex contribute to this change. The 
tradition of organizational theory has, during the latest years, aimed attention at 
agencies and their role in the developments of the European integration. In this 
tradition, this thesis investigates what role – If any – Frontex plays in the development 
of this specific policy instrument. To what extent Frontex contributes to the EU-Cape 
Verde partnership will be investigated from the objectives mentioned in the EU-Cape 
Verde Joint Declaration from 2008 where Frontex was assigned an implementing role. 
The thesis is neither a study of European agencies nor organizations, but a study of the 
migration management policy in the EU. Yet, the study can be seen as a contribution 
to the scholarly debate concerning agencies and their role in the European integration 
process. This is due to the fact that the analysis touches upon important topics 
concerning the role of an agency within one particular policy framework. This is 
interesting analytically, because based on an organizational approach, the structure of 
agencies is expected to have an impact on policy. Empirically, the creation of the 
mobility partnerships is interesting because they combine two different views on how 
to manage migration. On the one hand, the mobility partnerships have a central aim of 
fostering developments in third countries, and, on the other hand, they include parts of 
the security element of migration management by involving Frontex. This tension 
between security and development is an interesting characteristic that triggers the 
desire to study this further. This thesis investigates how Frontex contributes to the 
mobility partnership towards the overall objective of EU‘s migration management 
policy. Media and human rights activists have, since Frontex was established in 2004, 
given it a considerable amount of negative attention, and has criticised Frontex for 
failing to protect migrants in their attempt to reach Europe (Leonard 2009: 372). My 
curiosity on Frontex‗ role in the implementation of the mobility partnership was 
picked by the fact that it is a controversial agency (Neal 2009: 1), and the ongoing 
debate on Frontex make these questions even more interesting to study.  
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This chapter will provide the background for the two analyses on the mobility 
partnership and Frontex. The following passage on the recent developments of the 
migration management policy in the EU should be seen as an introduction to the topics 
under study, and as a review of the literature written and existing research on these 
issues. However, it cannot be read as a complete account of the complex patterns in 
the integration of the EU migration management; the aim is rather to shed light on the 
context in which the mobility partnerships have been created.  
 
1.2 European migration management policy 
Ever since the beginning of the European integration process the question concerning 
who decides in the EU has been debated. Where is the power centered, towards the 
member states or to the Union it-self? The European Union has both supranational and 
intergovernmental features. To put it simply, this means that in some cases decisions 
are taken at the European level rather than the national level, while in other cases 
decisions are taken by the member states. Between these two levels of decision-
making there are tensions because nation-states are critical of loosening up their 
sovereignty in order to give more competence to the EU level (Caviedes 2004: 289). 
Since the beginning of the European integration process the EU has strengthened its 
competences, and with the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009 this trend 
continues.  
 
The role of migration management policy in the EU has changed since the outset of 
the European Community in 1957, and the tendencies have slowly followed the 
European integration process. From being a concern of the EU member states, the 
migration policy has shifted towards EU competence at a supranational level. 
Originally, Justice and home affairs (JHA) was organized under the third pillar
3
 in the 
European Union. This pillar comprised a variety of policy issues: ‗immigration and 
                                                 
3
 In this thesis I will still use the pillar terms, although I am fully aware that this system was abolished with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009. The pillar structure in the EU was based on a separation between 
three pillars: a) The European Community, b) the Common Foreign and Security Policy c) Justice and Home 
Affairs (Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters). The EU level exercised competences in the first 
pillar, while the pillars two and three were based on inter-governmental decision making.  
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asylum policy, the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and judicial and police 
cooperation within the EU‘ (Smith 2009: 2). However, after the Amsterdam treaty in 
1997 the EU has gained more competence in the fields of immigration and asylum 
cooperation (Boswell 2003; Caviedes 2004; Chou and Carrera 2006: 137; Smith 2009; 
Wolff 2006: 1) which means that this policy sphere is now under the competence of 
the European institutions; the European Commission proposes, the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Council legislate, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
adjudicates (Chou and Gibert 2010: 7), and that the formal legislation process is co-
decision; which has been the case since 2004 (Givens and Luedtke 2004: 145).  
 
The shifting of competence in the area of migration and the free movement of labor is 
related to core interests in the EU member states. This is in particular so because 
transferring power impinges upon a crucial element of the nation states, namely their 
national sovereignty (Castles 2003; Caviedes 2004). Traditionally, nation- states view 
migration management policy as an important issue of control because it touches upon 
cultural, economical and social rights to the citizens through the welfare state 
(Huysmans 2000: 767).  
 
To understand the creation of the mobility partnerships and to place Frontex within the 
context of the EU migration management policy, the following topics will be 
presented below: the externalization of the EU migration policy, the migration-
development nexus and the securitization of the migration policy. In the recent 
developments in the EU migration policy I have observed a shift in the EU migration 
management policy from an internal to an external focus. This shift can be seen as 
crucial for the development of the mobility partnerships, and in the following section, I 
elaborate some of the reasons why this is so.  
 
1.2.1 Externalization of the EU migration policy 
At the heart of the evolution towards a more supranational migration policy, lies an 
orientation from an internal to an external focus on migratory issues. The internal 
migration refers to the free movement of workers within the Union (Chou 2009a: 545), 
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and the migration policy in the EU was to a large extent treated as an internal issue 
until the end of the 1970s
4
. This is a politicized topic and has been at the top of the 
agenda in several EU summits during the last years (Bosch and Haddad 2007). With 
the Amsterdam treaty, the high level meeting in Tampere, creation of the High Level 
Working Group on Asylum and Immigration (HLWG) and the Global Approach to 
Migration, migration policy has turned towards an external issue for the EU
5
. Below, 
these developments will be studied more in detail.  
 
It is important to recognize that the external dimension of the Union is defined in two 
different ways. The first is related to the European neighboring countries and potential 
member states, while the second definition of external dimension is related to 
countries that are not close to the EU borders and considered sources of migrants and 
illegal trafficking (Wolff et al. 2009). This thesis will focus on the second definition, 
and more specifically, the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership.  
 
With the Amsterdam treaty in 1997 the migration policy became introduced to the EU 
external dimension by stating that ‗measures aimed at ensuring the free movement of 
persons…with respect to external border controls, asylum and immigration’ was to be 
included in the Union legislation in order to create an area of freedom, security and 
justice (AFSJ) (Official Journal of the EU 1997 as cited in Chou and Gibert 2010). 
After the Amsterdam treaty, migration management was still connected to both 
internal and external issues, and in 1998 the HLWG on Immigration and Asylum was 
established. This task force aimed at improving the coordination between the 
responsible ministers, meaning that representatives from both JHA and experts from 
the fields of foreign, security, development and economic policy were represented 
(Castles 2003: 219; Chou and Gibert 2010). The HLWG became thus established as 
the decision-making power ‗for all European migration policies containing an 
―external dimension‖‘ (Chou and Gibert 2010: 7). The fact that both JHA ministers 
                                                 
4
 This rhetoric started in 1979 when the Commission stressed that ‗external migration regulation is ―a corollary 
to the Community policy of free movement of Community workers‖‘ (Chou 2009a: 545) 
5
 As written the footnote above I am aware that this trend started in the beginning of the 1980s, however this 
study will focus on the recent trends from the 1990s until today.  
8 
 
and foreign ministers met in this HLWG has reinforced the trend that migration is of 
both internal and external dimension. One year later, under the Tampere high-level 
meeting in 1999, the externalization of the migration management policy was given 
full political attention (Boswell 2008; Wolff 2008: 255). At that time, there were 
hundred thousands of asylum-seekers originating from Kosovo arriving into the EU 
(Busch 1999). And in this context, the Tampere meeting initiated the creation of a 
common framework for asylum in addition to cooperation with countries of origin 
(Bosch and Haddad 2007: 5). This summit meeting in Tampere gathered European 
heads of state who together flagged out four elements of concern: partnership with 
third countries, a common European and asylum system, fair treatment of third-
country nationals and management of migratory flows (Caviedes 2004: 294). Under 
the partnership umbrella, cooperation with third countries was put on the agenda, and 
under the flag of a common EU asylum and immigration policy the aim of a 
‗comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and 
development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit‘ became stated (Chou 
2009b: 7; European Parliament 1999; Lavenex 2006).  
 
Since the Tampere meeting the EU has continued to emphasize the external dimension 
of the migration policy through summit meetings and Council conclusions from Feira 
in 2000 to The Hague Program in 2004 and the Hampton court in 2005 ‗which called 
for urgent action to develop the external dimension‘ (Boswell 2008: 499). In 2005 the 
Council of the European Union came out with a strategy paper for the inclusion of 
external dimensions of Justice and Home Affairs (Council 2005). In this paper they 
stated that:  
 
In order to meet the expectations of the citizens the European Union must 
respond to the security threats of terrorism, organized crime, corruption…and to 
the challenge of managing migration flows…to be effective it needs to work with 
countries outside the EU…and therefore make JHA a central priority in the EUs 
external relations. 
(Council 2005) 
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With this Strategy Paper the inclusion on the external dimension in the JHA became 
even stronger and connected to partnerships with third countries in order to cope with 
the challenges caused by international migration. The foundation laid for cooperation 
with third countries continued with the Cotonou agreement in 2005. There they 
manifested a strengthened cooperation between the EU and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states on economic, social and cultural development (Cotonou 
Agreement 2000 and 2005). Within this context of externalization of the migration 
management policy, the Global Approach to Migration emerged in December 2005. 
The global approach to migration addressed the idea of combining different policy 
areas all connected to migration into one action plan for the EU. It touched upon 
development, social affairs and employment, external relations and justice and home 
affairs. It carried forward the idea from the Tampere conclusions in 1999 of dealing 
with migration in cooperation with third countries (European Commission 2006), and 
thereof the idea of creating mobility packages between EU member states and third 
countries was set off.  
 
In this context of externalization of migration policy two events are seen as important 
for giving political impetus to the developments sketched above. For years, there has 
been a large amount of immigrants arriving in Europe through West Africa. In 2005, 
two incidents, resulting in the death of several migrants, in the cities of Ceuta and 
Melilla visualized the dangers thousands of migrants were facing in the hope for a 
better life in Spain. These incidents attracted attention to the fate of the irregular 
migrants arriving to Europe and therefore, migration became a salient political issue, 
which forced the political leaders to think differently on migration management 
(Bosch and Haddad 2007; Boswell 2008; Lavenex and Kunz 2008; Nærland 2005). 
These events can be seen to have led to two trends: the externalization of the migration 
policy, and as well the idea of combining migration and development (Lavenex and 
Kunz 2008: 449). 
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1.2.2 The migration-development nexus and security 
In this context of externalization of the migration policy and increased dangers related 
to migration from the African continent to the European, the connection between 
migration and development has evolved. The term ‗migration-development nexus‘ was 
conceived by Sørensen et al. in 2002 (Chou 2009b: 4; Lavenex and Kunz 2008: 441) 
and captures the idea that remittances and circular migration may have a positive 
impact on levels of development and prevent the negative effects of migration related 
to the so-called ‗brain drain‘ (Skeldon 1997: 3). However, the connection of migration 
and economic development was first mentioned in the Ascencio report in 1990, where 
it was stressed that ‗development can, eventually, reduce migration‘, and secondly that 
migration also can have an effect on development, but that ‗this relationship is quite 
ambiguous‘ (cited in: Chou 2009b: 5). Prior to the introduction of the connection 
between migration and development these two ideas were seen as two distinct areas of 
concern, or as a result of lacking or failed development (Lavenex and Kunz 2008: 
441). Yet, the migration-development nexus has not led to the creation of the mobility 
partnership itself. It is important to situate the migration-development discourse within 
the wider context of how European governments have sought to regulate migratory 
flows to identify its connection to the partnerships. European countries are both facing 
problems of unemployment, and an aging and shrinking population (Martin and 
Zürcher 2008: 12). The EU has therefore sought to cooperate with countries outside 
the EU borders in order to manage the migratory flows, while at the same time 
focusing on coordinating the migration management within their borders.  
 
Lavenex and Kunz (2008: 452) claims that ‗the EU has started to revise its originally 
securitarian frame of migration policy to adopt the migration-development nexus‘. 
However, as Chou (2009b) points out, the EU migration management is still pending 
between two ways of managing migration. This is shown in the mobility partnership 
where both ‗repressive‘ and ‗progressive‘ components of migration management are 
present. The repressive dimension is related to classical migration control instrument 
i.e. border control, while the progressive is related to the facilitation of return of 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants in Europe, and management of the root causes 
11 
 
to migration (Boswell 2008). This leads me to introduce an important feature of the 
migration policy in the EU: the strengthened focus on the relationship between 
migration and security.  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s the migration discourse was largely connected to the 
‗destabilization of public order‘ (Huysmans 2000: 754), and the European ministers of 
interior and the European governments have ‗securitised the migration agenda‘, by 
connecting it to law and order (Chou 2009a). After the cold war, international 
migration was added to the list of ‗new threats‘ connected to fear for Islam, 
international criminal networks and a fear that migration might lead to increased 
terrorism (Guiraudon 2001: 268). Thus, a new discourse connected to migration and 
security emerged. This migration-security nexus led to an increased emphasis on 
border control and security when dealing with migration together with the discourse 
related to the migration-development nexus.  
 
1.3 The mobility partnerships 
The idea of mobility partnerships was launched in a Commission Communication on 
Circular Migration and mobility partnership in 2007 (European Commission 2007), 
but the idea on cooperation with third countries originally stems from the Tampere 
Conclusions laid out in 1999. The partnerships were presented as packages of 
migration projects created in order to manage migration through strengthened 
cooperation and dialogue between the governments in the European Union and third 
countries. The aim of these partnerships, according to the Commission considerations 
in 2007, was ‗to facilitate ―circular migration‖, which is broadly defined as ―a form of 
migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal [or authorised] 
mobility back and forth between [the EU and some third countries]‟‘ (Chou 2009b: 1). 
The Commission saw the need for improving various forms of legal migration between 
the EU and third countries (European Commission 2007). In addition, the partnerships 
were said to enhance the cooperation with third countries adapted to the labour needs 
in European countries, while at the same time prevent ‗brain drain‘ and ‗incentives for 
illegal migration‘ (European Commission 2007). So, what are these partnerships? 
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Basically, they are instruments made in order to put policy into practice. The policy 
that they are going to put into practice is the common EU migration management 
policy, spelled out with the Tampere Conclusions in 1999.  
 
Official negotiations started in 2008 and pilot projects have so far been developed with 
three countries – Cape Verde, Moldova, Georgia. Senegal has, as well, been 
approached for negotiations, however, these negotiations have stalled since 2009 
(Chou and Gibert 2010: 1). The mobility partnerships involve many different actors, 
and those specifically involved are the signatory member states, the specific third 
country involved, the European Commission, the Council, and the EU-level agencies 
Frontex and the European Training Foundation (ETF)
6
. However, the European 
Parliament and the European Court of Justice are not involved in the partnerships.  
 
The three partnerships all involve different projects, and they are created on the basis 
of migration initiatives between the specific third country and EU member states. The 
mobility partnership with Cape Verde includes 29 proposed projects, while the 
partnership with Moldova includes 34 and the one with Georgia 17. Each partnership 
is signed with different member states and while the partnership with Georgia has been 
signed by 16 member states and Moldova with 15, the partnership with Cape Verde 
has been signed only by five EU member states (Council 2008a; 2008b; 2009). Every 
partnership is tailor made and develops projects and cooperation on issues of concern 
for the specific countries participating.  
 
1.3.1 The EU-Cape Verde relationship  
Cape Verde became a relevant partner country for the EU through the external 
dimension discourse related to the non-neighbor countries of the Union, and is a small 
country on the West African coast with a total population of approximately 500.000 
(World Bank 2010). The question why this country in particular is involved in a 
partnership with the EU member states can be addresses in several ways. Cape Verde 
                                                 
6
 The ETF is involved in education and training of the European neighbouring countries (in this case Georgia 
and Moldova) and will therefore not be covered specifically in the study.  
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is a country of emigration and transit, and the Cape Verdean Diaspora is said to be 
even larger than the country‘s population (Carling 2003: 335), thus large populations 
of Cape Verdeans in some European countries (as shown in figure 1.1) has made this 
country particularly interesting for some member states. Cape Verde is also an 
important country of transit for potential migrants to the European continent. Potential 
illegal migrants
7
 from Ghana, Mali and Senegal heading for Europe are passing by 
Cape Verde in order to reach the Canary Islands (Carling 2008: 10). This can give a 
background idea for why Cape Verde was chosen to the mobility partnership pilot 
project; however, the EU-Cape Verde relationship was first initiated within the 
framework of the Special Partnership. The EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership will 
be implemented by ‗The Local Monitoring Group set up under the Special 
Partnership‘(Council 2008a: 6), and it was from this the EU-Cape Verde mobility 
partnership emerged. 
 
The Special Partnership was launched in 2007 as an economical and social partnership 
between the EU and Cape Verde, including issues from poverty alleviation and 
development, to regional integration and economical cooperation and migration 
(Percival 2008). In this climate of EU-Cape Verde cooperation, Cape Verde already in 
2006 expressed a wish to loosen its ties to the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), and limit the access of West African nationals to its territory, a 
decision taken in cooperation with the EU (Afrol News 2006). This shows how Cape 
Verde, with the special partnership, is severing its ties to the West African region, 
while enforcing the ties to Europe. With the mobility partnership these ties are even 
stronger.  
                                                 
7
 Illegal in the European context, but legal in Africa with the free movement of persons within the ECOWAS 
area (ECOWAS 1975). 
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Figure 1.1: Cape Verde: Description of country, position to Europe and Cape Verdeans in Europe 
Ref: (Carling 2004: 114) 
 
1.3.2 The EU-Cape Verde partnership 
The EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership was launched in the Joint Declaration in 
May 2008 and signed in September 2008 (Council 2008a). The EU member state 
Portugal is responsible for the implementation of the initiative, while Spain, France, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands have signed the Joint Declaration along with 
Portugal (Reslow 2010). Several aspects introduced in the Commission 
Communication on circular migration and mobility partnership have been elaborated 
in the mobility partnership with Cape Verde which, as written in the Annex, includes 
29 proposed projects (Council 2008a). These projects are the main interest in the 
partnership between the EU signatory states and Cape Verde and they are concentrated 
on different issues of migration management and mainly separated in three different 
sectors. The first is connected to mobility, legal migration and integration, the second 
puts emphasis on migration and development while the third concentrates on border 
management, identity and travel documents, fight against illegal migration and 
trafficking in human beings. This third sector is the relevant sector for Frontex. A 
working agreement with Frontex is under development, and when it becomes initiated 
it is expected to strengthen the cooperation on border control, which will be 
investigated further later in this study.  
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The Joint Declaration mentions that Frontex is responsible for the implementation of 
the activities in the field of information exchange and risk analysis, training, research 
and development as well as coordination of joint operation measures. The idea is also 
to introduce an active discussion on the improvement of technical equipment and 
technology at borders (Council 2008a). However, does Frontex meet this 
responsibility? This study aims to explore to what extent Frontex actually is 
responsible for the implementation of the border management policy in Cape Verde, 
and to investigate the position of the EU-CV partnership within the overall migration 
framework in the EU. To do so, the EU-level agencies and their particular 
characteristics will be discussed below.  
 
1.4 EU-Level agencies and Frontex  
Since the 1970s EU-level agencies have emerged as important actors on the EU 
policy-making scene, and they have grown rapidly in both competence and number 
during the 1990s and up to the 2000s (Barbieri and Ongaro 2008: 395). However, the 
literature written on EU-level agencies seems to be twofold. On the one hand, 
researchers stress the intergovernmental nature of the Union‘s agencies and on the 
other strand researchers point to the fact that the agencies are steered towards the 
European level (Egeberg and Trondal 2010). The tension between the agencies 
connection to the Union and to the member states is important in order to understand 
the nature of the EU agencies, and according to Trondal (2010: 129) the aim of 
developing the European agencies has been to ‗fill the institutional vacuum between 
the Community and the member-state level of government‘. ‗These bodies have real 
power and their opinions and decisions can have a direct impact on individuals, 
regulators and member states‘ (Busuioc 2010: 1).  
 
The EU-level agencies vary in form and structure, yet they are all part of the executive 
branch of the EU system. There are many definitions of agencies. For instance, 
Majone (2006: 191) says that ‗‖an agency‖ is an omnibus label to describe a variety of 
organizations which perform functions of a governmental nature, which generally 
exists outside the normal departmental framework of government.‘ Leonard (2009: 
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373) explains this clearly: ‗[you can describe agencies] as specialized bodies, which 
are staffed with experts that generally deal with matters of scientific or technical 
nature‘. At present, there are 35 EU-level agencies. Structured after the former pillar 
structure the Commission separates between five different types of agencies. Hence, 
there are 23 Community agencies, three agencies under the framework of the 
European Common Foreign and Defence policy, three agencies related to police and 
judicial matters, and at last six so-called executive agencies. This thesis will 
concentrate on the former mentioned agencies and more specifically Frontex.  
 
The agencies are dealing with different tasks, and the nature of each agency varies in 
both organizational and governance terms (Trondal 2010: 147). As already mentioned, 
they are all part of the EU executive branch, but they can be either regulatory or non-
regulatory. A regulatory agency is an agency dealing with ‗implementation of the 
regulatory and legislative framework‘ which means that it deals with decision making 
in the Union, while the non regulatory agencies are dealing with information expertise, 
analysis, risk assessment administration and management and hold no decision-making 
responsibility (Trondal 2010: 130,151). In this context, Frontex can be described as a 
non-regulatory agency. It holds no decision-making power, and is an operational co-
operative body for dealing with border management in the EU (Busuioc 2010: 28). 
 
1.4.3 Frontex: The European border control agency  
Frontex was created in 2004 and made operational in 2005. It has a total staff of 272 
persons, and is daily dealing with issues related to control of the EU external borders. 
The Frontex agency personnel is either national seconded experts with the EU agency 
as their primary affiliation for a certain period, or permanent staff, mainly with a 
background from the police or national border guards. The national seconded experts 
can hold their position for two years, and this period might be extended with two more 
years if wanted (Frontex 2010b). It is argued that the practical role of Frontex is 
limited (Rijpma 2010) but nevertheless, Frontex is under constant criticism for being 
hostile towards the human rights and is an easy target for criticism since its role is to 
control the European borders from unauthorized migrants (Rijpma 2010: 1). Frontex is 
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working on the basis of its mandate and has got six main tasks (see figure 1.3). These 
tasks are pointed out by the Council Regulation No 2007/2004 of October 2004 and 
are as following:  
 
a) coordination of operational cooperation of the external borders between the 
EU member states b) assistance to member states in training of national border 
guards and to establish common training standards c) conduct of risk analyses 
d) to stay updated and follow the developments in research relevant for control 
and surveillance of external borders, e) assisting member states when increased 
technical and operational assistance at external borders is required and finally f) 
assisting member states in organizing joint return operations  
(Official Journal of the EU 2004)  
 
Frontex‘ management board consists of one representative from each member state 
and two representatives from the European Commission. These officials are highly 
skilled with expertise on Frontex‘s tasks; namely police and border guards (Leonard 
2009: 383).  
 
 
Figure 1.3: Frontex structure 
Ref: (Frontex 2010a)  
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In the Joint Declaration of the EU-Cape Verde partnership it is stated that Frontex is to 
have a role, the question is what kind of role? How does Frontex contribute to the 
mobility partnership?  
 
This passage has aimed at introducing the empirical background for the study. 
However, there are still topics that remain to be pointed out, and questions that need to 
be answered. This review on both the recent developments of the migration 
management policy in the EU and the agency of Frontex leads me to ask the two 
following overarching research questions: 
 
Research questions 1 and 2: How does the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership, as 
an instrument of EU migration management policy, contribute to the overall objective 
the EU migration management policy of improved coordination? And how does 
Frontex contribute to the EU-Cape Verde partnership?  
 
1.5 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis will be organized in five chapters, including this introduction. In chapter 
two I will elaborate the research design, identify the theories that inform the analysis 
and outline the hypotheses to be tested. In chapter three I will consider to what extent 
the EU-Cape Verde partnership contributes to the overall objective of the EU 
migration management policy. This will be done empirically by mapping out how the 
mobility partnership enhances the coordination between the involved partners 
followed by investigating this through an institutional perspective. In chapter four, I 
will examine the effectiveness of Frontex against the criteria of contribution to the 
mobility partnership. The fifth and final chapter will summarize the findings, and 
discuss how this study can contribute to further develop the research on European 
migration cooperation. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Research design 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate the analytical framework in order to find out to 
what extent the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership contributes to a change of the EU 
migration management policy and how Frontex contributes to the EU-Cape Verde 
partnership. This chapter will do this by using two approaches building from insides of 
organizational and institutional studies of political life. First, I will do this by an 
identification of how institutional theory can account for how a structure becomes 
institutionalized and second by identifying how organizational structure helps account 
for how Frontex contributes to the mobility partnership. These approaches will be 
applied in two different analyses, and together they will be useful in order to 
investigate the recent developments in the EU migration management policy.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: First, the dependent variable of this study is 
defined and operationalized. Second, an institutional perspective is presented in order 
to shed light on how the actors‘ behavior affects policy outcomes. Third, 
organizational theory is presented by focusing on organizational structure in order to 
account for how the formal structure of an organization contributes to its ability to act. 
Fourth, the methodological challenges and choices of the thesis will be presented and 
discussed.  
 
2.1.1 What am I studying?  
In order to show about how a policy instrument such as the mobility partnership 
affects the overall migration management policy, it is crucial to establish what the 
study is investigating. What is the dependent variable and how is this variable 
operationalized?  
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I will investigate the recent developments in the EU migration management policy. 
More specifically, the point of departure for this study is the Tampere Council 
Conclusions from 1999, which laid out four thematic directions for the development of 
the EU migration policy in order to develop a common EU asylum and migration 
policy. One of these directions was ‗management of migration flows‘, and this is 
where the idea of combining migration and cooperation with third countries came 
about. What is this EU migration policy articulated in the Tampere conclusions? Its 
main purpose is to coordinate activities between the EU member states, third countries 
and the Commission. According to Olsen (1983: 3) it is important to get insights into 
conditions for and effects of alternative forms of organization and coordination in 
order to understand political systems. Indeed, it is interesting to use this approach in 
order to see to what extent the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership is contributing to a 
change of the overall EU migration management policy, by looking at its goals for 
more coordination.  
 
In the Tampere conclusions and in the Commission Communication they stated as 
follows:  
 
[E]fforts to design effective policies to foster circular migration and to develop 
mobility partnerships clearly call for increased coordination and cooperation 
between the Commission and Member States in order to ensure maximum 
synergy between activities at the two levels and to avoid them impinging on 
each other‘s competences 
(European Commission 2007: 14) 
 
According to (Peters and Pierre 2006: 120) coordination can be measured out from 
several criteria, and in this study coordination will be understood as the improvement 
of a particular problem, the implementation of shared understandings for common 
conceptions and the location of issues to one governmental structure. Coordination 
thus set the rules for how the development of a common approach (to the EU 
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migration management policy) can begin, and what is expected to achieve with when 
the Commission seeks to increase coordination.  
 
2.2 A new institutional perspective 
The argument for using an institutional perspective to study the recent developments in 
the EU migration management policy is because institutions are expected to affect 
political outcomes (Ragsdale and Theis 1997: 1283). This thesis builds on the 
assumption that the creation of institutions has an impact on politics, which will allow 
us to investigate change and continuity in a specific policy structure (March and Olsen 
1996: 248).  
 
The institutional approach will be fruitful for the analysis of the EU-Cape Verde 
mobility partnership because it accounts for how institutions emerge. It will be 
possible to evaluate the nature of EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership, and thus study 
how this partnership contributes to the overall EU migration policy. In order to use 
institutional theory it is important to have knowledge about various characteristics of 
the structure under study such as procedures, rules, internal cooperation and ways of 
thinking within this particular structure. The underlying idea of institutional theory, 
and the premises for the analysis in this thesis is the idea that change is ‗an ordinary 
part of political life‗ (Olsen 2009: 4).  
 
2.2.1 Rules, procedures and shared understanding 
The institutional perspective derives from organizational theory and focuses on the 
relationship between institutions and individual behavior. This perspective aims to 
account for political life through values and identity. From an organizational 
perspective all institutions are organizations, but all organizations are not institutions 
(Egeberg 2003: 118-119). Both organizations and institutions affect actors‘ behavior 
on policy, and in both approaches the organizational structure based on rules is 
important. However, the difference between organizational and institutional theory is- 
according to the institutional perspective- that rules become integrated in actors‘ 
behavior over time and the formal rules become taken for granted. When organizations 
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become infused with values, identities, culture and a common understanding, actors 
behave in a certain way. The importance here is that organizations are growing 
increasingly complex by adding formal norms and practices, which means that an 
organization does not immediately become an institution. The reasons for why actors 
behave in accordance with this formal structure can be explained by the institutional 
theory.  
 
The new institutionalism is a theory that covers many concepts, and consists of 
different logics on how institutions affect actors‘ behavior. The importance when 
studying institutions is ‗how to interpret and explain various institutional structures 
and dynamics‘ (Andersen 2001: 5). Based on Olsen‘s (2009) definition of an 
institution, institutionalization is in this thesis defined as a process through which an 
organization becomes progressively insulated with the characteristics of an institution. 
In a process of institutionalization there will be more clarity, more agreement and 
consensus with regard to rules and practices. There will be more clarity and consensus 
among common vocabulary, understandings and expectations, and at last there will be 
developed a shared understanding of the legitimate resources- the behavioral norms 
will be understood as natural and legitimate (Olsen 2009: 10).  
 
The new institutional approach to political life uses norms and ideas as an explanation 
of institutional design. Its analytical function is that institutions reflect broadly shared 
ideas and norms of what constitute appropriate modes of governance (Tallberg 2010: 
635). It aims attention at actors behavior driven by a dynamic of legitimacy and 
appropriateness (Parsons 2007: 67), and focuses on the infusion of culture within an 
institutional framework (Parsons 2007: 75). Hence, the actors are guided by the logic 
of appropriateness, which emphasizes that human actions are seen as rule-based 
(March and Olsen 1998: 951). This means that they are expected to follow rules that 
connect identities of the institutions to the particular situation. When individuals enter 
an institution they learn how to act within this institution, and when they meet a new 
situation they try to associate this situation with a situation for which rules already 
exist (March and Olsen 1989: 169). The logic of appropriateness is based on the 
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assumption that political institutions are collections of corresponding rules and 
routines defining appropriate actions by seeing the relation between roles and 
situations.  
 
2.2.2 The coherence hypothesis 
How then, can institutional theory account for the extent to which the mobility 
partnership contributes to a change of the overall EU migration management policy? 
The explanatory variable of institutionalization is operationalized by the following 
indicators based on institutional theory: standard operating procedures, rules and 
shared understanding. These indicators will be used to account for the extent to which 
the mobility partnership provides the member states and Cape Verde with a common 
set of language making the policy more coherent and holistic. The findings from the 
interviews and the data will be structured in order to investigate to what extent these 
analytical indicators are present in the development of the mobility partnership. Based 
on the theoretical approach presented above the following hypothesis have been 
developed:  
 
H1: The mobility partnership provides the EU migration management policy with 
clarity and acceptance of a set of rules, together with patterns of standardized 
operating procedures – all factors that contributes to change the overall migration 
management policy. The consensus to use one specific migration management 
instrument with the EU states involved will, through time, make this instrument 
institutionalized. This assumes that the migration flows between Cape Verde and the 
EU is controlled and coordinated in a more efficient and holistic way. 
 
2.3 An organizational perspective 
In order to understand the process by which organizations insulate actors‘ behavior 
with particular roles, it is necessary to unpack the structure of the organization. 
Without including the organizational dimension of politics it is difficult to sufficiently 
understand political processes (Sverdrup and Trondal 2008: 9). An organizational 
approach to European integration tends to focus on individual actors‘ organizational 
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context with the aim of explaining their ‗behavior, interests and identities‘ (Egeberg 
2004: 199). This means that different characteristics of an organization affect how the 
actors within it act and that policy choices are affected by this specific context. What is 
an organization? According to Scott, ‗organizational structures are arrangements of 
roles and norms that impose certain expectations and obligations on the incumbents of 
a particular organization‘ (Scott 1981 in Egeberg 2006: 32) The way through which 
organizations can explain individuals‘ behavior, interests and identities is thus by 
having a look at its structure. 
 
There are multiple ways through which organizations affect actors. According to 
Egeberg (2004: 200) they affect through organizational structure, demography, 
geographical location and institutionalization. The second research question in this 
study is created on the basis of organizational theory and the assumption that 
organizational structure has an impact on policy by guiding the actors‘ behavior. This 
part of the study focuses on the independent variables organizational structure, 
organizational demography, organizational size and budget and the impact of primary 
structure of organizations because these variables can together be helpful to account 
for how agencies have an impact on policy through the organizations‘ action capacity.  
 
The aim of using organizational theory in this study is to investigate how Frontex 
contributes to the effectiveness of coordination of the EU-Cape Verde mobility 
partnership. The idea is not to make a total account of all of the factors that create an 
organizational identity, but rather to investigate closer whether three specific 
assumptions concerning the structure of an agency apply to the case under study in this 
thesis, namely the organizational structure, organizational demography and 
organizational size and budget.  
 
Formal organizational structure is expected to focus decision making actors‘ attention 
on specific ‗problems and solutions (Egeberg 1999: 159), which again is fostering the 
capacity of the bureaucratic unit into one specific direction and thus is expected to 
increase the ‗action capacity’ of the organization and the specific competence of the 
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individuals working in the organization (Egeberg 1999: ibid). Based on an 
organizational perspective this is how we can study agencies. Thus, agencies are 
expected to increase the decisions taken by experts and they reduce the probability that 
decisions are taken only because they are politically important (Egeberg 2003). How 
does this apply to my case? The study of Frontex seeks to investigate how it may have 
been possible for Frontex to contribute to the EU-Cape partnership. The following 
explanatory variables will be used in order to account for the this contribution, and 
based on earlier studies this will be applied the specific case of the mobility 
partnership.   
 
2.3.1 Organizational structure 
Organizational structure is important in this context because of the idea of bounded 
rationality. Decision-makers have limited time and they must prioritize their working 
load. In the decision-making they have to make compromises because they are 
‗bounded‘ and face problems of capacity (Christensen and Lægreid 2006b: 17; 
Egeberg 2006: 33; Sverdrup and Trondal 2008). Personal preferences are put a side 
and less likely to be of importance when studying organizational behavior, because 
actors become bounded to the organization within which they work and spend their 
time (Egeberg 2003: 78). Some projects and solutions get attention from the policy-
makers while others do not; political organization is a standardized selection based on 
routine and this is the basic selection mechanism in the formal organizational structure 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006a). Thus, attitudes and actions and the content of the 
policy they formulate are formed by the organization they belong to and the 
organizational setting in which they work.  
 
Organizational capacity – size and budget 
The organization investigated in this study is large in both size and budgetary capacity. 
This makes it relevant to believe that they will be able to attend most of the things they 
consider as important to enhance the effectiveness of the organization, and thus it is 
likely to believe that Frontex‘ participation in the mobility partnership is contributing 
to its effectiveness. The intention is to consider the size and the budget of the 
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organization in order to investigate the capacity of the individuals in the particular 
organization (Egeberg 2003: 78). The expectation in this study is that the size and 
budgetary capacity of the organization matters in order to follow up tasks and issues of 
relevance for the organization.  
 
Primary and secondary structure 
Since Frontex acts as a primary structure for the staff we will expect that both 
permanent and seconded national experts will have their interests and identities shaped 
by this particular agency (Egeberg 2004: 212). This makes it less likely that the 
decisions are taken based on national interests. Accordingly we will expect the 
organizational capacity of Frontex to be increased and that both the permanent staff 
and the seconded national experts will be influenced by Frontex as a primary structure 
(Trondal and Egeberg 2010: 9). However, it is expected that the management board 
have their national country as their primary affiliation, and Frontex as their secondary 
affiliation (Trondal and Egeberg 2010: 9).  
 
Organizational demography 
The organizational capacity of an organization refers to its capacity in terms of 
personal characteristics of the members working in the specific organization. Relevant 
factors for the organization I am studying would be education, professional expertise 
and social and geographical background (Egeberg 2003: 79). The expectations of 
Frontex are that the background of the individuals in the organization will have an 
impact on the identity and the capacity of the staff in the organization. In this study it 
is chosen to focus primarily on the professional background. The professional 
background is expected to be of importance because all the staff working in Frontex 
has got the same professional background. This is likely to create a specific 
professional identity within the organization.  
 
The aim of using organizational theory in this thesis is not to investigate the executive 
formation, but rather to use this as an account for why it has been possible for Frontex 
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to play a role in the mobility partnership. Thereafter, based on the organizational 
theory and the variables presented above, the following hypotheses are developed: 
 
H2: Since Frontex is a primary structure and since the staff working in the organization 
has got the same professional background, a unified and specific identity is expected to 
be created. 
 
H3: The capacity in terms of budget and size of the organization is expected to give the 
organization a large action capacity, which means that the individuals within the 
organization will be able to participate and to do the work they are assigned to do.  
 
H4: The organizational structure of Frontex is expected to lead to a more efficient and 
coordinated border management policy in Europe, which again will provide the 
member states with continuity when dealing with border management.  
 
Based on earlier studies the agency is expected to be more influential on the 
implementation of policy than the formulation of policy (Trondal and Egeberg 2010).  
The idea is not to make a complete account for the organizational efficiency of 
Frontex, but rather to use parts of the organizational approach to shed light on its role 
in the mobility partnership. It is important to note that there are other aspects of the 
organizational approach that can be used to account for the role of Frontex in the EU-
Cape Verde partnership, but this thesis is limited to the above-mentioned approach. 
 
2.4 Methodology and data 
In order to develop this project it is crucial to establish type of study and the purpose 
to be achieved with it. The thesis is conducted as a case study, and the data sources are 
mainly drawn from semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The conducted 
interviews are the main source of information for the study, and have been conducted 
with officials in various EU-level institutions, Cape Verde and Frontex. 
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2.4.1 Case study 
The aim of this study is to investigate the EU-level agency Frontex and the mobility 
partnership in order to gain knowledge on the overall migration management policy in 
the EU. In order to reach this aim it is considered fruitful to conduct a single case 
study. According to Yin (2003) the advantage of conducting a case study is to get an 
enhanced understanding of complex social phenomena. This case study is contributing 
in this manner by giving an enhanced comprehension of the current developments in 
the European migration management policy. The study has got a deductive character, 
and the research question and hypotheses are developed based on existing knowledge 
from the literature. The aim is to test if the assumptions based on the institutional and 
organizational theories apply to my case, and depending on the result the hypotheses 
will be strengthened or weakened. If the theory does not apply to my findings this 
means that my case lies outside of the range of what the theoretical framework can 
explain (George and Bennett 2005: 116), and will be interesting for further studies 
where the theoretical framework should be broadened.  
 
The advantages of a case study is to understand a larger class of similar units, and the 
intensive study of one single case makes it possible to get valuable information to use 
in further building-block research. Such a case study does not make it possible to 
generalize over the findings, but is valuable in its possibility to contribute in theory 
development (George and Bennett 2005: 32-33, 80). However, what is illuminating 
about a case study is its ability to draw evidence on one single case and its attempt, at 
the same time, to emphasize features of a broader set of cases (Gerring 2007: 29), thus 
this study provides a thick description of the events concerning the role of Frontex in 
this particular mobility partnership. 
 
Case studies contain advantages as well as obvious drawbacks, and when selecting a 
case the main motivation should be relevance to the research objective of the study 
(George and Bennett 2005: 83). By studying one specific case intensively you do 
‗trade-offs‘ compared with studies observing many cases generally, and case studies 
are particularly disposed to challenges concerning selection bias (George and Bennett 
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2005: 22) and to generalize over the findings. It is difficult to generalize over the 
findings in the case study because ‗it includes…only a small number of cases of some 
more general phenomenon‘ (Gerring 2007: 43). Empirically motivated studies are used 
when would like to know more about, and better understand a concrete phenomenon 
(Martens 2010: 19), and theory is applied in order to shed light on the specific 
phenomenon. ‗The problem should be included in a well-informed evaluation of gaps 
in the current knowledge of the chosen topic, and the researcher need to make sure that 
the proposed research will make a significant contribution to the field‘ (George and 
Bennett 2005: 74). The contribution of Frontex to the mobility partnership has, at the 
time of writing, not been studied before, and thus this thesis aims to broaden the 
knowledge of the partnerships and the EU migration policy. The study of the mobility 
partnership is intrinsic in order to study the dynamics of the European migration 
policy. This is because it captures both the security and the development issues which 
are highly important in the externalization of the migration policy, and as well it 
makes it possible to study patters of coordination in the EU migration management 
policy which have been at the height of the agenda since the Tampere Conclusions in 
1999.  
 
Frontex and the EU-Cape Verde partnership will be investigated by using a set of 
defined variables and hypotheses derived from the applied theory. The connection 
between theories and the operationalization of concepts is of crucial importance for the 
validity of the study and is linked to the measurement validity (Adcock and Collier 
2001). The variables and indicators developed in order to structure the analysis are 
mentioned above, and they are operationalized in accordance with the organizational 
and institutional theory. Using the variables from relevant theory and constructing 
hypotheses strengthens the validity of the study, and the advantage of this kind of case 
study is a strengthened internal validity (Lund 2002: 106). 
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2.4.2 Data: interviews and primary documents 
The thesis is based on three source-gathering components. The main component is 
consultation with key informants through interviews in Brussels
8
, Warsaw and Cape 
Verde. The other components are reviews of primary documents from the institutions 
under study and other written documentation and literature. These documents are 
important in order to locate and understand what is the crucial interest in this area of 
study, while the interviews have given an opportunity to get in-depth knowledge about 
important issues not described in the official documents and are, as claimed by Yin 
(2003: 106) one of the most valuable ways of collecting information to a case study 
analysis. In order to get an overview of Frontex‘ tasks and the agreement of mobility 
partnership, organizational charts, scoreboards and annual reports about agency 
activities have been consulted. This triangulation of data is done in order to enhance 
the confidence of the findings, and is crucial in order to increase the validity of the 
study. Triangulation means that the findings are based on various methods and that the 
conclusions are taken on the basis of more than one single evidence (Bryman 2006; 
Gerring 2007: 217; Yin 2003: 116).  
 
2.4.3 Semi-structured interviews 
According to (Goldstein 2002: 669) gaining valid and reliable data from elite 
interviews demands that the interviewer is well prepared, construct sound questions 
and get in touch with good respondents and code the answers accurately. The process 
of collecting information to this study has resulted in valuable information on the 
specific policy area under study. The interview-based background for the analysis 
consists of 17 in-depth conversations with interlocutors from various European 
institutions. The interviews lasted from 20 to 60 minutes. Six interviews were 
conducted in Brussels, while 11 interviews were conducted by phone from Oslo. Some 
additional information was collected by e-mail correspondence with officials in Cape 
Verde, Frontex and the International Organization of Migration (IOM). The interviews 
were mainly conducted over a time period of four months, from June 2010 until 
                                                 
8
 The interviews in Brussels were conducted face to face, while the interviews in Warsawa and Cape Verde were 
conducted by phone and by e-mail correspondence.  
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September 2010, and some of the respondents were contacted by e-mail or telephone 
for clarifications after this period.  
 
Many considerations must be taken in order to enhance the validity and reliability of 
interviews. First of all there is one crucial thing that one needs to assure: ‗getting in the 
door‘ (Goldstein 2002). The population of my study is officials working on the 
mobility partnership and in Frontex, and ideally the sampling frame should be 
identical to the population (Goldstein 2002: 670). The respondents are gathered from 
relevant institutions, both at the national and the European level (as mentioned above). 
In this case it has not been possible to conduct interviews with the whole population, 
partly because of the multilevel character of the mobility partnership and also due to 
the high pace of change in the positions, particularly in the Commission since the 
launch of the partnerships in 2008.  
 
In order to get hold of informants an informative e-mail was sent to all the potential 
interviewees. This mail included information on my research project, aim of the 
interview and the time period available for conducting interviews. In addition, I 
emphasized that the information provided in the interview would be confidential. Most 
of the interviewees agreed on the terms, while one of the informants emphasized that 
the information I received could be used as background information only. However, all 
the informants are kept anonymous.  
 
When collecting informants I took advantage of the so called ‗snowball sampling 
method‘, which means that some of the interlocutors advised me to contact other 
interviewees who might be of interest for the study (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). 
Some of the interlocutors advised me to contact other potential interviewees already 
when they answered my first request, while others gave me the name and number of 
other informants after the interview was ended. The snowball method could represent 
some threats to the validity of the study due to the biased representation that this might 
invoke. In order to avoid the pitfalls of snowball sampling interlocutors was not only 
located by this method. In order to make sure that the respondents recommended by 
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the snowball-method were relevant I made an outline of potential interlocutors that I 
would contact by e-mail or telephone. Many of the recommended interlocutors were 
already on my list of interviews, which strengthened my confidence on the 
recommendations from the key informants. The interviews conducted are semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions which is a good way of conducting 
interviews in order to get the respondents the chance to give good answers that reflects 
their role as the experts and to inform the research (Leech 2002: 668). 
 
The interviews have mainly been conducted without using tape recorder, but by taking 
notes. This makes the interview situation more complex and challenging, but on the 
other hand it is better taking notes than using the tape recorder if the alternative is a 
closed door (Goldstein 2002). In Brussels, I experienced that most of the interviewees 
did not want me to use the tape recorder during the interviews. It is likely to believe 
that the interlocutors would have been less open if I had insisted on using the tape 
recorder, thus in Brussels the digital tape recorder was consistently not used. However, 
to increase the reliability of the interviews, my first impressions and thoughts were 
tape-recorded right after the interviews. This was the case with the interlocutors 
interviewed by phone as well, yet some of these interviews were tape-recorded with 
consent from the interlocutors. In order to increase the reliability of the findings in the 
interviews, every informant had the possibility of reading the transcript from the 
interview or reading the quotations used in the thesis. Some of the informants added 
comments to the interviews, while some has made a citation check on the final quotes 
in the thesis.  
 
2.4.4 Documents 
In order to complement the findings from the interviews I have consulted primary 
documents from the European Commission, Frontex and the Council. These 
documents have been consulted systematically, and information from the documents 
corresponding or diverging from the interviews has been used to strengthen the 
findings in the analysis. In order to use the documents in a valuable way it is useful to 
study them as ‗purposeful communication‘ (George and Bennett 2005: 99), which 
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means that by taking use of documents it is important to consider who is talking, to 
whom the text is addressed, and in which context the text is written.  
 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I have presented the analytical framework that will be applied in the 
analyses to come in chapter three and four. The two analyses will be based on two 
different analytical approaches. First, the new institutional approach will be applied in 
order to account for the patterns of cooperation and interaction within the mobility 
partnership. In this analysis I will draw on insights from institutional theory. The 
second analysis will be explained by an organizational approach using the 
organizational structure to account how Frontex contributes to the mobility 
partnership. The study will be conducted as a single case study which will allow me to 
investigate one specific policy in depth. By using triangulation of data the validity of 
the research will be increased and strengthen the findings based on interviews, primary 
resources and written literature.  
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Chapter 3 
 
An institutional account for the EU-CV 
partnership 
3.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to investigate if the EU-Cape Verde partnership contributes 
to a change towards the overall objectives of the EU migration management policy in 
the EU. In this chapter I argue that the EU migration management has been changed 
with the EU-CV mobility partnership, and that this partnership is an instrument on its 
way to become institutionalized. This change will be investigated through the lenses of 
an institutional approach because it allows us to investigate change and continuity to a 
set of political arrangements. We can see the creation of an institution through the 
establishment of a specific pattern recognized by acceptance of rules and common 
standard operating procedures. This again is expected to provide clarity among the 
participating actors, and will contribute to change the coordination of the overall 
migration management policy.  
 
This analysis will be conducted in two steps. First, the empirical findings from the first 
research question will be brought up in order to shed light on the mobility partnership 
as a structure. This section will be structured in two sub-sections: patterns of 
cooperation and patterns of interaction. Second, a theoretical analysis will be 
conducted in order to theoretically analyze the empirical findings. Finally, this will be 
followed by a short summary at the end of the chapter.  
 
3.2 Mobility partnership: From a European perspective 
The EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership was launched in 2008. Two years after it‘s 
initiation it is interesting to investigate to what extent the partnership contributes to a 
change in the EU migration management policy. Based on an institutional approach it 
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is assumed that the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership affects the EU migration 
management policy as it becomes institutionalized because it provides the member 
states with a common set of acceptance, clarity of rules and by providing patterns of 
standardized operating procedures. Instead of operating with different migration 
management instruments in each country they operate with one. In this way we would 
assume that the migration flows between Cape Verde and the EU is effectively 
controlled and structured in a more holistic way. Thus, the research question to be 
answered in this chapter is as follows: how does the EU-Cape Verde mobility 
partnership, as an instrument of EU migration management policy, contribute to 
change its overall objective of improved coordination?  
 
The mobility partnership is an initiative involving the Commission, five EU member 
states, Cape Verde, Frontex and the European Training Foundation (ETF)
9
. Frontex is 
located in Warsaw, Poland while the other EU institutions are located in Brussels and 
the Cape Verdean government and police authorities in West Africa. The EU member 
states‘ ministries are located in different capitols around Europe, and all these actors 
cooperate together within the framework of the mobility partnership. In this passage 
we will see that the coordination between the relevant actors has increased after the 
framework of the mobility partnership started, which indicates that this particular 
policy instrument is indeed contributing to a change of the overall migration 
management policy. We will also investigate why and how this is the case by building 
on insides from institutional theory.  
 
3.2.1 Patterns of cooperation – on paper 
Before investigating how the various actors cooperate within the framework of the 
partnership, it is interesting to map out how the Joint Declaration from 2008 can be 
seen as the start of a process of institutionalization and how rules and standard 
operating procedures are present in the declaration. The first step in evaluating 
political processes is to investigate how they have been planned on paper (Peters and 
                                                 
9
 The ETF will not be touched upon in this analysis because it is involved in the cooperation on human resources 
development and professional qualifications and not relevant for the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership. 
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Pierre 2006: 400). In the Joint Declaration the implementation of the partnership has 
been outlined in detail, and the objectives of the partnership – followed by the 
participating actors – are proclaimed.  
 
An institutional change comes about through the introduction of features that is 
recognized in an institution. When institutions are investigated, the point of departure 
is very often their inability to change, and their ‗state of inertia‘ and inability to change 
(Olsen 2010: 119). Nevertheless, institutions start to develop somewhere, and from 
something – and this is what is interesting in this study. The formal rules of the 
partnership can be traced back to the Joint Declaration, and may be important in order 
to assess the mobility partnership‘s institutional formation.  
 
The nature of cooperation of the mobility partnership is, according to the Joint 
Declaration, an ‗open-ended, long-term framework based on a political dialogue‘ 
(Council 2008: 6). This political dialogue will be established between the ‗European 
Community, its Member states and Cape Verde‘ (Council 2008: 6). With this 
statement, the formal patterns of cooperation are already established. This document 
establishes the formal objectives of the partnership, and shows us that this particular 
instrument focusing on political dialogue will fulfill the coordination of the EU 
migration policy. Further, it is stated that Frontex will participate in the 
implementation phase of the partnership together with the member states with aid from 
the Community. All the actors involved in the partnership will participate with their 
competences ‗in accordance with the applicable procedures‘ (Council 2008). These 
procedures, which can be interpreted as rules, are listed in the Annex of the 
partnership. The Annex is thus where the rules are established on paper, and where the 
formal content of the partnership is outlined for the first time.  
 
In order more accurately to define migration issues of common interest, the 
Signatories intend to develop a migration profile of Cape Verde and pursue 
their dialogue and consultations in a spirit of partnership. They intend to meet at 
least twice a year at the appropriate level in order to review priorities and 
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continue to develop of the Partnership, as the case may be. The Partnership will 
be implemented at operational level by the Local Monitoring Group set up 
under the Special Partnership and to which the various other actors involved in 
the Mobility Partnership will be associated as appropriate  
(Council 2008: 6, my emphasis) 
 
The Joint Declaration also shows that the development of the mobility partnership will 
be driven further through the framework of the Special Partnership. Thus, the Joint 
Declaration has established that they will meet twice a year, and by doing this, they 
endorse the coordination and enhance the efficiency of the partnership. This is an 
example of the common rules that are established with the partnership.  
 
With a view to implementing the Mobility Partnership, the Signatories confirm 
their intentions with regard to the initiatives set out in the Annex hereto 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Annex"), within the limits of their available 
financial means. They intend to carefully coordinate their respective efforts and 
update the Annex, which contains a list of proposed activities, on a regular 
basis; 
(Council 2008: 6) 
 
The Joint Declaration shows how the scoreboard will be a coordinative medium in 
order to enhance the cooperation between the participating member states, Cape Verde 
and the Commission, and thus introduces the standard operating procedures to the 
partnership. The common rules and standard operating procedures are established 
already in the Joint Declaration. By outlining the cooperation between the member 
states, Cape Verde and the Commission the rules are established. On the basis of these 
rules the further cooperation has evolved. This shows how, already in the Joint 
Declaration, prerequisites for a process of institutionalization are present.  
 
This is all planned on paper. However, how these rules and standard operating 
procedures are evolved in practice will be subject for the continued analysis.  
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3.2.2 Patterns of cooperation – in practice 
The European Commission 
The European Commission has got a crucial role in the EU-Cape Verde mobility 
partnership. The Directorate-General (DG) for Justice, Freedom and Security (JLS)
10
 , 
DG Development (DEV) and DG Aid, Development and Cooperation (AID) are all 
involved in the mobility partnership. All the interviewees stress the important role the 
Commission represents in organizing and structuring the cooperation among the 
participants in the mobility partnership.  
 
After the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership was created, the responsibility of the 
policy framework has been accorded to one specific DG in the Commission, and 
further delegated to one specific section. The responsible DG is DG JLS and more 
specifically the Section for Visa Policy and External Aspects of Migration
11
. In this 
section there are 13 positions, including the Head of Unit. There are all together six 
policy officers; whereas one of them is working specifically on the EU-Cape Verde 
mobility partnership and two others are assigned the responsibility for Georgia and 
Moldova accordingly. These policy officers are not full time delegated on the mobility 
partnership. One of them states as follows (Interview 3 2010): ‗I would say that the 
mobility partnership (in some periods) could take about 50 percent of my work but 
normally 40 percent when it is busy, while it now [June 2010] would take only 20 
percent of my work load‗.  
 
The Commission is participating in the partnership both from Brussels and through the 
EU delegation in Praia (Cape Verde) which is responsible for most of the direct 
contact with the Cape Verdean officials in Praia. One interviewee at the EU delegation 
in Cape Verde emphasizes the central role of DG JLS in Brussels:  
                                                 
10
 Since July 2010 the structure of the Commission‘s Directorate-General has changed, and the former DG JLS is 
now separated into DG Home and DG for Justice and Fundamental Rights. The mobility partnership and Frontex 
are from now on dealt with in DG Home. Throughout the thesis the term DG JLS will nevertheless be applied, 
since this was the standard when the fieldwork of this thesis started.  
11
 The mobility partnerships have been dealt with in the section for International Affairs since July 2010, and the 
section for Visa Policy and External Aspects of Migration does no longer exist.  
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So, basically what happens is that there are meetings in Brussels where usually 
we do not attend, usually it is [the policy officer in DG JLS] and then [this 
officer] will report back to us. My head of delegation does sometimes attend 
those meetings, but normally only if he is in Brussels already and then he joins 
while he is there. 
(Interview 10 2010)  
 
As well, Frontex officers highlight the role of the Commission in the mobility 
partnership and their strong effort and success in order to coordinate the mobility 
partnership (Interview 8 2010). The section for Visa Policy and External Aspects of 
Migration is responsible for the partnership, thus policy officers in other sections in 
DG JLS, other DGs and the EU Delegation in Praia tell in the interviews that they 
normally receive the information they need through this channel. One interviewee 
describes it in such a way that one could say that the DG JLS serves as a node for the 
cooperation within the mobility partnership framework  
 
…we have regular meetings in Brussels, and we are all invited by the 
Commission. We discuss proposals, we discuss overlapping and the progress of 
the mobility partnership is measured in the Commission task force [in the DG 
JLS] 
(Interview 8 2010)  
 
This is followed up by another interlocutor who states that: ‗…if I am interested to 
know something about the mobility partnership I contact the Commission [DG JLS]‘ 
(Interview 2 2010). This seems to be the regular pattern, and even within the 
Commission structure the other DGs give us an indication that DG JLS is the nodal 
point in this cooperation ‗…this work is mostly done between Frontex and DG JLS 
and we often have to contact the DG JLS if we would like updated information on 
these issues‘ (Interview 6 2010).  
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How does the Commission work in order to be such a nodal point for the participants 
in the mobility partnership? The Commission invites the other participants in the 
mobility partnership to Brussels on regular occasions to a group called ‗the task force‘. 
This is an ad hoc meeting-group led by DG JLS where all the involved actors are 
invited to discuss changes and further cooperation within the framework of the 
mobility partnership (Interview 12 2010). The invited actors are officials from 
Ministries of Interior, Ministries of Justice and Ministries for Foreign Affairs from all 
the participating member states, and one interlocutor in the Commission states that 
‗who is participating depends on what is being discussed in the specific task force‘ 
(Interview 12 2010). Sometimes one country even sends several officials from 
different ministries. This task force meets approximately three times a year and in 
addition to this most of the information is coordinated by e-mail. Interviewees from 
both the DG JLS and from other institutions confirm that the framework of the 
mobility partnership has made it easy to cooperate and keep in touch with involved 
actors. DG JLS holds in its position a list of relevant actors and officials to whom they 
send invitations.  
 
From every member state participating in a given mobility partnership we have 
a contact person. And much information is exchanged by e-mail. Sometimes 
this is enough, and then we do not have a meeting. Different countries have got 
different contacts – In Holland it is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Justice in Luxembourg etc. I have normally got two or three names  
in each country that I can contact. I contact everybody and then the person 
concerned will answer. They are all informed. 
(Interview 12 2010) 
 
The EU delegation in Praia 
The EU delegation in Praia deals with the implementation of the policy ‗on the 
ground‘ (Interview 10 2010). The delegation is the first point of entry and keeps direct 
contact with the Cape Verdean authorities and their national police. They are regularly 
in touch with the Commission in Brussels (both DG JLS and DG DEV) and with the 
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member states embassies located in Cape Verde. The Commission in Brussels stresses 
the fact that nearly all contact with the Cape Verdean government is delegated through 
the EU delegation in Praia (Interview 3 2010), and a policy officer from the EU 
delegation describes this as follows:  
 
I think that we are the ones who implement this on the ground. We have the 
play in shaping this to some extent, guided by [our colleagues in the DG JLS]. 
We are actually the first entry point for discussion with the Cape Verdean 
authorities. We have a monitoring role. We have to make sure that everything 
works on the ground, and if not we alert our head quarter.  
(Interview 10 2010) 
 
The Commission delegation in Praia is also responsible for the working group called 
‗Groupe Local de Suivi‘. This is a group where the Cape Verdean and the European 
member states‘ authorities meet to discuss the further developments of the mobility 
partnership and the Special Partnership (European Commission 2009: 6). They work 
with implementation of the partnership, and they meet approximately every three 
months in Praia. This is not only a group where the mobility partnership is discussed, 
but originally a working group for the Special partnership between the EU and Cape 
Verde (Interview 12 2010). The Commission representatives from Brussels only 
participate occasionally if they happen to be in Cape Verde, in the same way that the 
EC delegation in Cape Verde only participate occasionally in the meetings in Brussels. 
This pattern of cooperation was predicted already in the Joint Declaration from 2008, 
and is thus an indication of how the rules launched in this declaration have been 
practiced over time.  
 
The Council 
The EU migration policy is represented in different processes in the Council and is a 
topic of discussion in both JHA Council and in the General Affairs Council (Chou and 
Carrera 2006: 146). When the mobility partnership is discussed in the Council this is 
mainly brought up in the General Affairs Council (GAERC), and this is so because 
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‗the mobility partnership is clearly an issue of external relations‘ (Interview 4 2010). 
The GAERC is represented by the 27 EU member states‘ Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
The HLWG is placed under the GAERC and is a council working group representing 
both EU Ministers of Interiors and Ministers of Justice (Interview 4 2010). They are 
dealing with migration issues, and more specifically the mobility partnerships. This 
working group contributes to enhance the coordination between the participating 
member states, because it serves as a forum where every member state gets informed 
by the Commission on what is happening within the framework of the mobility 
partnership.  
 
[T]he participating member states are systematically informed through the 
HLWG and through this channel they get regular information on our work with 
Cape Verde within the framework of the mobility partnership 
(Interview 6 2010) 
Frontex 
Frontex officials participate regularly in meetings in Brussels, the Commission and in 
the Council concerning the mobility partnership. Topics directly concerning Frontex 
are discussed in the Working Party on Frontiers and False Documents (Interview 7 
2010). Frontex is present in the Council groups and parties where border management 
issues are discussed. Frontex is invited to make comments and to listen to discussions, 
and sometimes they are specifically invited to present their view on certain issues. 
Most of the meetings in Brussels are on invitation by the Commission (Interview 8 
2010). According to one Frontex official these are the advantages of the EU-Cape 
Verde partnership:  
 
For the moment, Frontex is trying to be better established as an agency, and the 
mobility partnership is making it quite visible what is happening in the field of 
cooperation with third countries. This will make the task of Frontex easier as 
well, and their position as a coordinator more stated  
(Interview 8 2010)  
 
44 
 
Frontex is also invited to the mobility partnership task force coordinated by the DG 
JLS, and through this task force they stay constantly updated on the projects in the 
mobility partnership.  
 
[W]e have regular meetings in Brussels, and we are all invited by the 
Commission. We discuss proposals, we discuss overlapping and the progress of 
the mobility partnership is measured in the Commission task force 
(Interview 8 2010)  
 
The role of Frontex in the partnership is mainly as a coordinator of border 
management. Frontex makes sure that bilateral agreements are well coordinated and 
stabilized and it tries to improve the cooperation with the third country- in this case 
Cape Verde – when something is not functioning (Interview 8 2010). This Frontex 
official stresses the fact that Frontex will not involve in a cooperation with a third 
country only because the Commission suggest such a cooperation (Interview 8 2010), 
but at the same time the mobility partnership makes it easier for Frontex to stay 
informed on what kind of work is done between Cape Verde and each involved 
member state.  
 
What it is all about is that the EU as a whole get a better overview of all the 
activities regarding Cape Verde and to avoid overlapping and achieve 
synergies....I have to say that at this moment Frontex is still negotiating the 
working arrangement with Cape Verde so what we try to do from Frontex‘ point 
of view is to contribute to the pilot project of the mobility partnerships which is 
an area of the Commission and to participate with our knowledge in the 
scoreboard
12
. In the meetings in Brussels they sit down and discuss the mobility 
partnerships and the specific proposals. There they assure that they are not 
overlapping and that the projects are made as tangible as possible.  
(Interview 8 2010)  
                                                 
12
 For more information on the scoreboard see p. 46  
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Cape Verdean institutions 
In Cape Verde the partnership is discussed and coordinated by three different 
ministries: the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Diaspora and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The coordinating ministry in Cape Verde is the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and ‗nothing happens without its consent or participation‘ (Interview 10 2010). 
In addition to the ministries involved in the partnership there exists in Cape Verde a 
National Council of Migration administered from various ministries where ‗these 
specific topics are discussed‘ (Interview 10 2010). This Council consists of 
representatives from all the relevant ministries in Cape Verde. The Cape Verdean 
authorities participate and are involved in the Groupe Local de Suivi and participate at 
High Level Meetings in Brussels. During the High Level Meetings the mobility 
partnership is often discussed in relation with the Special Partnership between the EU 
member states and Cape Verde (Interview 10 2010).  
 
This passage has shown that the mobility partnership, to a large extent, is coordinated 
through the European Commission, and more specifically the DG JLS and the policy 
officer responsible for the EU-Cape Verde partnership. This has made the patterns of 
cooperation between the member states more coordinated, and DG JLS serves as a 
nodal point for the partnership. Instead of bilateral cooperation between each member 
state and participating actor, the DG JLS serves as a common point of contact.  
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Figure 3.1: the DG JLS as a node for the EU-Cape Verde partnership (patterns of cooperation) 
 
3.2.3 Patterns of interactions 
How do all these actors interact in order to keep contact and to get necessary 
information across institutions and countries? How do they stay informed on every 
project included in the EU-Cape Verde partnership? The main answer is to be found in 
the scoreboard created by the Commission and more specifically, DG JLS. In the 
same way that the Commission DG JLS is the nodal point for cooperation in the 
mobility partnership, the scoreboard is its tool of interactions and cooperation where 
the partners and the projects involved are included on one paper. This creates a special 
framework of interactions where all the actors are constantly updated on what is 
happening within the EU-Cape Verde partnership. The scoreboard has been developed 
by the DG JLS and there is one scoreboard for each mobility partnership. The policy 
officer in DG JLS has the overarching responsibility of creating and developing these 
scoreboards, and they are used as a point of reference for all involved. This creates, to 
a large extent, a framework of interaction for the participating actors. It is divided into 
different sections from irregular, legal and development migration. In addition, each 
project is categorized as ongoing, concluded or planned activities. The actors have 
access to the scoreboard, they add in new activities and they see it as an organizing 
element for all the activities toward the third country in question. The scoreboard is 
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standardizing and formalizing the cooperation, by adding every initiative to one 
specific ‗box‘. The scoreboard makes them understand each other across institutions 
and countries, and as a result this framework of interaction prevents the involved 
partners and member states from launching overlapping projects related to migration 
management with Cape Verde. Thus, the mobility partnership is a structure which 
facilitates the possibility to see what each partner country is doing.  
 
The Commission scoreboard, which is distributed to all the partners, makes it 
easy to look over and cross-check if the initiatives each member states have got 
with Cape Verde are overlapping. The mobility partnership gives us better 
overview  
(Interview 8 2010)  
 
3.3 An institutional perspective 
In this part of the chapter, the empirical findings will be interpreted in light of the new 
institutional approach. Revisiting this theory, an institutional approach allow us to 
investigate continuity or change to a particular set of organizational arrangements 
(Olsen 2009) and by this it will be possible to understand the development of a 
political sphere. Above, the idea has been to map out the patterns of cooperation and 
patterns of interactions in the mobility partnership. This is expected to contribute to the 
coordination of the EU migration management policy. Based on the institutional 
theory, looking for emergence or change of rules and standard operating procedures 
can be helpful in order to understand how to observe coordination of the EU migration 
management policy. In the following section I will argue that these processes may be 
seen as an indication of a process of institutionalization and by this contribute to a 
change of the overall migration management policy.  
 
3.3.1 Patterns of cooperation 
According to the institutional theory, processes of routines are expected to generate 
continuity and change (March and Olsen 2006) and the standardized processes of 
cooperation in the mobility partnership demonstrate how routines can contribute to 
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such a change. On the basis of the empirical findings it is possible to argue that the 
EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership can be seen as effective in order to reach the 
overall objectives of coordination as stated in the Tampere Conclusions and the 
Commission Communication from 2007. 
 
In order to measure if the partnership constitutes a change to the overall migration 
management policy it is important to look at what new approached the partnership has 
added to the coordination of the migration management policy. In line with the 
assumptions from the institutional theory it is possible to discern the creation of rules 
already in the Joint Declaration of the mobility partnership. In the declaration the 
Commission established patterns of cooperation, concerning the implementation of the 
mobility partnership. These patterns of cooperation can be interpreted as having 
established a common goal for the actors involved, and a common set of rules 
concerning how the EU-Cape Verde partnership has developed. In this way, it has 
been possible to see –already on paper- that the mobility partnership created common 
rules and standard operating procedures in 2008. The declaration has been used as a 
guiding principle for how the partnership has evolved in practice, and a look at the 
objectives in the Tampere conclusions shows that this is what they sought to achieve – 
coordination and synergies.  
 
Moreover, the creation of the partnership may be seen to have led to the creation of 
rules in practice as well. DG JLS in the Commission has been recognized as a 
coordinating actor and may be seen as a nodal point of cooperation within the 
framework of the mobility partnership. Thus, creating more clarity, agreement and 
consensus over a particular problem is what recognized a process of 
institutionalization. The role of DG JLS may be interpreted as enhancing these assets. 
This may be seen as strengthened because the participating actors have agreed upon 
this – the role of DG JLS may be interpreted as legitimate. Since all actors have 
recognized DG JLS as the nodal point, every contact and cooperation within the 
framework of the mobility partnerships goes through this departmental structure. This 
might give us connotations to one important aspect within the new institutional theory, 
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namely how the actors behave according to the logic of appropriateness. Moreover 
they share a common understanding about the legitimate purposes of their action. 
Within the framework of the mobility partnership it is seen as legitimate to 
communicate through this specific channel, and the officials working in the DG JLS 
also perceive their role as such. Their behavior is in other words appropriate and 
legitimate. These features may illustrate how the patterns of cooperation in the 
mobility partnership are on its way to become institutionalized. The emergence of this 
institution may thus be seen as a contribution to both the overall migration 
management policy and the overall aim of more coordination. Not only the 
departmental structure of DG JLS, but also the activities they have launched points in 
the direction of more institutionalization. The task force may also be interpreted as 
such a rule; a rule for coordinating activities. The task force has contributed to order 
and predictability in the cooperation; two important prerequisites for 
institutionalization.  
 
To summarize the findings, the specific role of the DG JLS and its activities and tools 
of work can be seen to have created clarity among all the participating actors. When 
someone is in need of information and more clarity, they contact the DG JLS:  
 
The cooperation can sometime be a bit difficult. We often contact and get 
information through the DG JLS. They can provide us with the information we 
need  
(Interview 6 2010) 
 
Without the DG JLS and the partnership the countries participating in the partnership 
would have put forward their individual projects and they would not have been 
elucidated by the other countries participating. Now, the member states are taking 
advantage of the projects put forward in other countries. The partnership is not only 
creating clarity, but is also creating synergies in the sense that a project put forward in 
i.e Luxembourg might be achieved in another member states as well. In this way the 
participating countries learn best practices from each other.  
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This shows once more, that the patterns of cooperation, by its creation of rules and 
clarity, are contributing to a more frequent and close cooperation, creating synergies 
and preventing overlapping. In addition, the partnership has contributed to create 
processes of routines, which will contribute to change. Moreover, it is important to 
emphasize the state in which the actors see their actions as evident and even obvious. 
This may indicate that their actions are legitimate, which again is a sign of 
institutionalization. This can be demonstrated by this quote from a Commission 
official:  
 
I do contact interesting countries and countries that I do believe could be a 
potential partner in the mobility partnerships…of course, I always do lobbying 
on the things I am working on 
(Interview 3 2010) 
 
The network of cooperation that has been introduced by the DG JLS can add 
knowledge to show how the partnership contributes to the overall migration 
management policy. The extensive network of e-mail and contacts that is used to 
communicate across countries did not exist before the partnership became established. 
In earlier times the participating member states stayed in touch with the other member 
states on a random basis, and they were not regularly informed about ongoing work in 
other countries. The partnership has changed this, and even the member states that are 
not participating in this specific partnership are informed:  
 
The other member states are regularly informed about the mobility partnerships. 
Within the framework of the HLWG and the Commission task force the other 
countries get updates, and they can get information from expert meetings when 
the ideas of the mobility partnerships are discussed. Every member state is 
welcome during these meetings.  
(Interview 3 2010) 
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The creation of rules and clarity through the patterns of cooperation may imply a 
creation of a shared understanding for the migration cooperation in Europe. The 
migration projects are still the same, but all the participating member states are 
updated on what is going on in each country. When the interviewees emphasize that 
the symbolic value of the partnership is considerable it is reasonable to assume that 
this is a way of interpreting a shared understanding between countries. According to 
institutional theory, shared understanding is a part of a process of institutionalization, 
and may again indicate that the mobility partnership is on its way to become 
institutionalized. A process of institutionalization is a process of change, and thus it is 
possible to see that the mobility partnership is contributing to change the coordination 
of the overall migration policy. Patterns of cooperation that were absent earlier are 
now present. Manifested through the Joint Declaration and the patterns of cooperation 
it is thus possible to discern that the mobility partnerships contribute to the overall 
migration management policy by introducing rules and a shared understanding around 
a common policy instrument.  
 
3.3.2 Patterns of interaction 
According to the new institutional theory change is rule-bound and takes place through 
standard processes as ‗institutions interpret and respond to experience through learning 
and adaption‘ (Olsen 2009). With support from the institutional theory it may thus be 
possible to interpret the scoreboard as an example of the emergence of such a rule-
bound change. The scoreboard is available for every participant in the mobility 
partnership, and it is a way of reporting the various migration projects included in the 
partnership. It was introduced with the partnership and has contributed to create clarity 
and synergies between the participating actors. This is a channel where the participants 
are able to communicate, to keep updated and in addition it gives them the opportunity 
to have an updated and clear idea about what is happening at all times. New 
institutional theory highlights how a common vocabulary contributes to 
institutionalization. The scoreboard may demonstrate how the participating member 
states and the Commission develop a common vocabulary in order to achieve the goals 
of a coordinated migration management policy. The scoreboard can be interpreted as 
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an idea-sharing template, and it contributes to the creation of standard operating 
procedures leading to institutionalization.  
 
However, this shows that the migration management policy in the EU is better 
coordinated with the establishment of the partnership. However, as initially mentioned, 
researchers have claimed that the mobility partnerships are not new to the EU 
migration management policy. This study cannot reject this statement, but it can 
confirm that the projects within the EU-Cape Verde partnership is standardized and 
coordinated. The mobility partnership does not change specific policy projects; it is 
only contributing to coordinate the cooperation with Cape Verde between the 
participating member states. Moreover, interviewees have emphasized the role of the 
partnership as an instrument to achieve policy goals, and that they do not introduce 
anything new in the sense of projects:  
 
The mobility partnership is a tool to implement the policy launched in the 
[Tampere Conclusions]. This is only a tool to implement and this does not make 
any difference in how the policy is conceived or what is done  
(Interview 6 2010)  
 
The migration projects are the same and the participating member states have not 
changed their policy with the establishment of the partnership, but what this study 
confirms is that the partnerships have contributed to a high extent of coordination, 
which again may imply reduced costs, created synergies and that it has contributed to a 
process of institutionalization. It is therefore possible to confirm the hypothesis 
developed in chapter two saying that the mobility partnership creates a more holistic 
and efficient migration management policy.  
 
By the creation of common rules, standard operating procedures and the evolution of 
shared understandings it is also possible to notice a more efficient cooperation and 
coordination of the migratory measures in Cape Verde. Being another aspect highly 
emphasized by the various interlocutors, the mobility partnership as a framework of 
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interaction has resulted in noticeable changes in Cape Verde. From a European 
perspective, some policy officers state that the mobility partnership has an impact on 
the migration policy in Cape Verde and that the Cape Verdean authorities are 
becoming more structured and that the treatment of migratory issues in Cape Verde is 
going faster. ‗They are getting better at defining their own migration policy‘ 
(Interview 3 2010). As well, it is possible to see that the dialogue between the 
European Commission and the Cape Verdean institutions has increased after the 
mobility partnerships (Interview 6 2010).  
 
Before, immigration could be seen as a sensitive issue, but the mobility 
partnerships have changed this and we now stay in contact with third countries 
on a more regular basis and we discuss immigration issues more frequently  
(Interview 3 2010)  
 
A process of institutionalization contributes to a change in the political sphere, and 
the idea has been to illuminate that the partnership contributes to such a change. It 
is not wanted, nor maybe possible, to indicate how far this process of 
institutionalization has come, because institutionalization is always a question of 
degree (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 195). Institutionalization is a matter of degree 
because it is history dependent – only time can tell how it will evolve and how far 
the process of institutionalization has come (Olsen 2009: 6).  
 
3.3.3 Historical context  
In this process of institutionalization the historical context is of importance, and 
institutions may emerge, according to Olsen (2010: 122) as ‗an unplanned result…of 
historical processes as a social organism that evolve over time‘. In this regard it is 
interesting to see the development of the partnership within the context of the recent 
changes in the EU migration management policy. It might be said that the mobility 
partnership could not have taken place without the recent developments in the EU 
migration management policy. Historical institutionalists emphasize that political 
events happens within a specific historical context; ‗when a country industrializes 
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necessarily affects how it industrializes‘ (Steinmo 2008: 164). According to this strand 
of institutional theory the development of the mobility partnership could not happen 
without the historical context in which it was created. By time, as shown in chapter 
one, the migration management policy has become more externalized, the migration-
development nexus is emphasized, and the process of European integration has 
strengthened the European cooperation of migration management. The European 
migration discourse has undergone a process of change, and without these features, the 
mobility partnership may not have emerged as we see it today. The rules and the 
standard operating procedures still tell us how the mobility partnership is on its way to 
become institutionalized, and how this contributes to a change towards the overall 
migration management policy. Nevertheless, this does not stand in opposition to the 
fact that the recent developments in the EU migration policy may have given political 
impetus to this specific process of institutionalization and thus a possibility for the EU-
Cape Verde partnership to emerge. 
 
3.4 Summary 
The objective of the chapter was to study how the EU-Cape Verde mobility 
partnership contributes to the overall migration management policy in the EU. More 
specifically the aim has been to investigate the initial expectation that the partnership 
will contribute to a more holistic migration management policy. The analysis shows 
that the establishment of the EU-Cape Verde partnership does enhance the 
coordination of the EU migration management policy. This is because the mobility 
partnership has created a set of shared understandings, rules and standard operating 
procedures, which again signifies that it is on its way to become institutionalized. The 
process of institutionalization is still in an early phase. Following an institutional 
approach it is possible to discern the emergence of an institution, which is contributing 
to change the overall migration management policy. 
 
In what way does the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership contribute to the overall 
migration management policy? The mobility partnership is not initiating new policy, 
but is rather a new way of structuring the migration management where both third 
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countries and the EU member states and agencies are working together within one 
specific framework. Several of the interviewees state that these migration management 
issues could have been done without the framework of the mobility partnership, but 
many of them emphasize the symbolic value of cooperation and further integration on 
this topic (Interview 1 2010; Interview 2 2010; Interview 5 2010; Interview 6 2010) 
which may be interpreted as a shared understanding between the participating actors. 
One official from a participating member state emphasizes this with the following 
statement:  
 
Cooperation on the external border management is not of urgent matter for [my 
country], but since there is a framework of cooperation and since it is easy to 
join in this cooperation [we] find it useful and important to join in order to 
enhance the European integration on this issue  
(Interview 9 2010)  
 
The analysis above has brought up the importance of the context in which the mobility 
partnership was created. The recent developments in the EU migration management 
assigning more competence to the EU, the externalization of the EU migration 
management and the High Level summits emphasizing enhanced coordination of the 
migration policy have all together laid the foundation for the partnership to evolve. 
These recent developments have made way for the partnership to launch cooperation 
with Cape Verde and to focus on migration development, security and legal migration 
within a specific policy instrument 
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Chapter 4  
 
Border management in the EU-Cape 
Verde partnership 
4.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter we have seen that the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership has 
contributed to a change of the overall EU migration management policy 
operationalized by coordination. Thus, in this chapter it is interesting to study the role 
of Frontex in the same partnership. The aim of this chapter is to study how Frontex 
contributes to the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership towards the overall objective 
of EU‘s migration management policy. Thus, the aim is not to study the executive 
formation of the agency as such. Nevertheless, organizational theory and earlier 
studies on these issues will be used in order to understand how and why Frontex 
contributes to the partnership the way it does.  
 
First, how does the study of Frontex links up to the study of the EU-Cape Verde 
mobility partnership? The ambition of this thesis is to investigate the recent 
developments of the EU migration management policy. As mentioned in chapter two, 
the point of departure is the Tampere Council conclusions where the objectives for a 
common EU asylum and migration policy were stated. In the section of management 
of migration flows, ‗the need for more efficient management of migration flows at all 
their stages‘ was emphasized, focusing particularly on border management (European 
Parliament 1999). Frontex, six years later, is such an instrument for closer cooperation 
on border management and thus, by studying this particular agency, it will be possible 
to know more about the recent developments of the coordination of the EU migration 
management policy.  
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The hypothesis under study in the chapter assumes that the structure of Frontex leads 
to a more efficient and coordinated border management in the EU because of its 
organizational structure. The professional background of the staff, the agency‘s 
capacity in terms of budget and the agency‘s roles as a primary structure is expected to 
improve the agency‘s action capacity. This again will provide the member states with 
continuity when dealing with border management. This indicates that by assigning 
Frontex a role in the mobility partnership, the agency will strengthen the capacity of 
the partnership, which again will contribute to a more holistic migration management 
policy. 
 
This chapter is organized in two main sections. First, the empirical findings are 
presented in order to make an outline of what has been the contribution of Frontex to 
the mobility partnership on paper, followed by an outline of the contribution of 
Frontex in the EU-Cape Verde partnership in practice. Second, the empirical findings 
are evaluated by using the theoretical framework presented in chapter two. As seen in 
previous studies, assigning political tasks to agencies is said to have an effect on 
political steering by making it more efficient, manageable and effective (Egeberg 
2003: 122; Martens 2010; Trondal 2010), and it is argued that political processes 
cannot be sufficiently understood without including ‗both the organizational 
dimension(s) of executive orders and the organizational principles structuring 
international bureaucracies‘ (Trondal et al. 2010: 24).  
 
4. 2 Frontex in the mobility partnership 
Since Frontex, formally, is assigned a role in the partnership, border management is 
expected to have an impact on the overall implementation of the partnership. However, 
by studying the contribution of Frontex towards the mobility partnership it has been 
showed that its contribution to the partnership has been rather different than first 
expected. The following passage will show what was planned ‗on paper‘ followed by a 
description of what has actually happened ‗in practice‘.  
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4.2.1 Frontex’ contribution to the partnership on paper 
In order to evaluate the contribution of Frontex in the mobility partnership it is crucial 
to investigate what was originally set out as the objectives for Frontex. In the Joint 
Declaration from 2008 it was officially established that Frontex was to contribute with 
expertise to the EU-Cape Verde cooperation. More specifically, it was written that 
‗Frontex in particular‘ will have an important role in the implementation of the 
mobility partnership (Council 2008: 6). Frontex should coordinate the operational 
cooperation on border control between member states and third countries as well as 
developing operational cooperation within the framework of Frontex (Council 2008: 
5). We will now see how this has been planned on paper, and this is crucial in order to 
be able to assess Frontex‘ contribution to the EU-Cape Verde partnership.  
 
In the Annex of the Joint Declaration three specific activities involving Frontex were 
mentioned. First, an agreement between the Cape Verdean national police and Frontex 
concerning information exchange, risk analysis, training, research and development, 
coordination of joint operational measures and ‗…an agreement to launch an active 
discussion on the improvement of technical equipment and technology at borders‘. 
Best practices and improved cooperation between border guards in Cape Verde and the 
EU member states were also accentuated (Council 2008: 13). Second, a proposal in 
order to make Frontex emphasize the development of the common core curriculum for 
border guards, basic training and the program on falsification of documents. This 
second proposal in the Joint Declaration is said to be implemented by the national 
police in Cape Verde. Third, a proposal led and coordinated by Frontex, proposed by 
France. The idea presented in the Annex is that France and Cape Verde will cooperate 
on security and training in document control with aid from Frontex. These three 
proposals each constitute one project and they are stated as goals for including 
cooperation with Frontex in the mobility partnership. More specifically these 
proposals describe the formal cooperation through a working arrangement
13
.  
                                                 
13
 A more detailed description of the working arrangement will be found on p. 62 
60 
 
Once the working arrangement enters into force, the task of Frontex is to assure that 
the agreements in the working arrangement are continued and established through 
formal cooperation. According to one of the Frontex officials the aim of Frontex is to 
‗stabilize the bilateral agreements between the third country and EU member states‘ 
(Interview 8 2010). More specifically, if the cooperation is limited to bilateral 
cooperation level between a member state and a third country, there is no insurance for 
the third country that the training cooperation or joint operation cooperation will 
continue over time, and the bilateral cooperation will more or less remain ad hoc
14
. By 
involving Frontex, it is suggested that a common framework is established which will 
assure that an operational cooperation will continue in the future with the specific third 
country. In addition, Frontex assures that the specific third country receives relevant 
information, and that they will be invited to Frontex‘ ‗national training coordinators 
community‘ (Interview 8 2010). When third country officials are participating in 
training activities they are being invited and funded by Frontex, and this training is 
‗highly regulated and happens under formal structures‘ (Interview 8 2010).  
 
When third country officials join Frontex‘ training program they are invited to take 
part in the various training programs organized under the umbrella of Frontex. The 
Frontex umbrella will in this case be the common core curriculum and they take part in 
the Frontex training given by border guards from various EU member states. Frontex 
funds the training and this is done by paying hotel, travel and commodity expenses of 
the third country officials coming to Europe in order to participate in training 
(Interview 15 2010). The training takes place in the European training academies. 
These academies are not Frontex‘, but are situated in various European countries and 
they are driven by the hosting country. There are 11 academies in 9 different member 
states
15
 and Frontex‘ role is to coordinate the work between the EU member states and 
third country (E-mail correspondence 3 2010). The EU member states are in charge of 
                                                 
14
 However, later in this thesis we will see how such a bilateral agreement with Spain has assured 
cooperationbetween Frontex and Cape Verde, and has created solutions to complications in border control 
between Europe and West Africa.  
15
 Finland, Lithuania, Germany, The United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, Slovakia, the Netherlands and Romania.  
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the training and the joint operations, while the task of Frontex is to organize and 
prepare in cooperation with the member states. Thereafter, Frontex is financing and 
coordinating the implementation, but they are not doing the implementing work 
themselves; this is provided by the EU member states (Interview 15 2010). When 
border guards from various European countries are gathered in joint operations they 
wear their own national uniforms, supplemented by an insignia on their sleeve 
showing that they are representing Frontex (Solberg 2009: 32). How does this 
description correspond with the way Frontex work in practice, and more specifically in 
the Cape Verdean case?  
 
At the time of writing, the proposed activities in the mobility partnership with Cape 
Verde have not been implemented. A Frontex official describes the contribution of 
Frontex as follows:  
 
The current work of Frontex in the EU-Cape Verde partnership is only to 
contribute to the pilot project of the mobility partnership which is an area of the 
Commission and to participate with our knowledge in the scoreboard 
(Interview 8 2010)  
 
However, what is interesting is that the proposed activities in the EU-Moldova and 
EU-Georgia partnerships have been put into practice already. Importantly, this will not 
be a comparative analysis of these three countries, but still it is interesting to observe 
that they have implemented the border management aspects in various paces. The 
interviewees have made several comparisons to the other cases, and it has been made 
clear that it has been somewhat easier implementing the partnerships with Moldova 
and Georgia than Cape Verde (Interview 3 2010). This section of the analysis focuses 
on the Cape Verdean case of translating proposed activities into actual operations, and 
identifies the developments and fragments of this process. The intention of this 
passage is to investigate what has been particular for the EU-Cape Verdean case that 
has contributed to this seemingly irregular delay in operations.  
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4.2.2 Frontex’ contribution to the partnership in practice 
The idea of creating agencies has, according to theory, been to increase the efficiency 
of the political process and to take the technical and expert processes away from 
political steering. How does this apply to my case? Hill and Hupe (2009: 136) say that 
when studying policy-formulation and implementation there is often a discrepancy 
between the formulated policy and the result. The anticipations to the implementation 
are often a matter of ‗rose-colored expectations‘ (Hill and Hupe 2009: 136). In this 
case it is interesting to see how the implementation of the proposals in the Joint 
Declaration corresponds with the formulations from 2008. In order to put the proposed 
activities of the Annex into practice several things need to be settled, and several 
instruments are used in order to formalize the agreement. In this section the 
developments of the Frontex-Cape Verde cooperation after the establishment of the 
Joint Declaration from 2008 is sketched out.  
 
When Frontex is to formalize operational cooperation with a third country they can do 
this in three different ways. The first- and preferred- way of cooperating with a third 
country is by launching a working arrangement. The second possibility is to facilitate 
and support the operational cooperation between a member state and a specific third 
country. The third option would be to associate Frontex with an international 
organization, ‗depending on the international organization and already concluded 
working arrangements with international organizations (Interview 8 2010). At the time 
of writing, Frontex is on its way to conclude a working arrangement with Cape Verde. 
Thus, a direct operational cooperation (which can only be achieved with a working 
arrangement) between the two partners has not yet been launched.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Possible ways of cooperation with third countries 
 
Launching an operational cooperation directly between Frontex and the third country 
is the most favorable way of cooperation because this is the only way to cooperate 
directly with the third country. Nevertheless it takes time to do it, and this is a more 
1: Working arrangement  
Direct operational cooperation 
2: Bilateral arrangement 
through one European country 
3: Cooperation through 
international organizations 
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complex process than the two other ways of cooperating (Interview 8 2010). Thereby, 
we see that in order to start implementing the formulated proposals in the mobility 
partnership there is only one instrument that can be put in place — namely the 
working arrangement. All the projects spelled out in the Annex are based on the fact 
that Frontex needs to establish a working arrangement with Cape Verde. Even though 
there are several projects mentioned in the Joint Declaration, the involved partners 
(Frontex and Cape Verde) are only going to sign and negotiate one working 
arrangement. The working arrangement establishes the cooperation and spells out 
details concerning every possible way of cooperation with the specific third country. 
Frontex has already concluded working arrangements with Moldova and Georgia, 
signed in August and December 2008 respectively. Then, what is special about the 
working arrangements and how do they work in practice? 
 
Before the working arrangement between Frontex and Cape Verde can be finalized 
several stages need to be fulfilled. How is the operational cooperation between Frontex 
and a third country established? Operational cooperation is a broad term, which 
includes the four main pillars of Frontex‘ external cooperation: information exchange, 
risk analysis and joint operations, training, research and development (Frontex 2010a: 
1, Interview 11 2010). By process-tracing the developments of this particular policy, it 
is possible to unravel how the policy formulations from the mobility partnership come 
into practice.  
 
The first step from policy formulation to implementation takes place in the Risk 
Analysis Unit (RAU) in Frontex (see figure 4.2). The task of the RAU is to investigate 
the migration routes in and off from Europe in order to make analyses of where joint 
operations and training, organized by Frontex would be necessary (Interview 16 2011). 
In order to start cooperation with a third country Frontex‘ RAU advises, on the basis of 
analyses that cooperation can start. Following this, the second step in the development 
of the working arrangement is to establish a proposal -draft mandate- written by the 
Frontex staff which will be presented for the management board. The External 
Relations section in Frontex writes this draft mandate. The draft mandate contains a 
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justification as to why Frontex should cooperate with the specific third country, 
guidelines for negotiations, and a briefing of the financial needs of such cooperation. 
The third step towards implementing the working arrangement includes Frontex‘ 
management board. The draft mandate needs an approval from the Frontex 
management board before the formal negotiations can start. Once approved by the 
management board Frontex can start the formal negotiations with the specific third 
country within the framework of the guidelines presented in the draft mandate. When 
the formal negotiations between the third country and Frontex are completed both 
partners initiate the working arrangement proposal. After the negotiations are finished, 
and the text is written, the draft working arrangement text is sent to the Commission 
for comments and opinions. Moreover, once Frontex, Cape Verde and the Commission 
agree on the formulated text it is sent for a final approval in the Frontex management 
board. After the formal approval by the Frontex management board the executive 
director in Frontex and the third country are authorized to sign the final document. 
Then it enters into force and the initiatives are ready for discussion and the 
implementation of the projects launched in the Joint Declaration can officially start.  
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Figure 4.2: Steps in the formulation process of the working arrangement 
 
It is clear that Frontex‘ role in the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership is not activated 
before this working arrangement is enforced. Thus, the interesting question is why it is 
not yet implemented, and how can this be accounted for from an organizational 
perspective?  
 
At the time of writing the working arrangement has recently been approved by the 
management board (Interview 16 2011), yet it still remains to be signed by the 
executive director and a Cape Verdean official. Already in August, a Frontex official 
confirmed that the working arrangement was positively welcomed by the Commission, 
and that the finalization of the working arrangement ‗should not be a victim of long 
discussions‘ before the final approval (Interview 8 2010). Moreover, it has taken over 
four years from negotiations started between Frontex and Cape Verde until the 
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management board approved the working arrangement. What are the reasons for this 
delay?  
 
The formal negotiations of this working arrangement started in May 2007 right after 
Frontex‘ management board mandated that negotiations for a working arrangement 
could start (Interview 11 2010), however informal contacts were established with Cape 
Verde already in 2006 (Frontex 2006). The management board mandated that 
negotiations could start after recommendations from the Frontex staff in the executive 
support of Frontex, and more specifically in the division of external relations and the 
RAU (Interview 10 2010, Interview 11 2010). In 2008 Frontex officials went to Cape 
Verde for exploratory talks (Carling 2008: 11). This is interesting because it helps 
answering the question under study, namely: how does Frontex contribute to the EU-
Cape Verde mobility partnership? The timeline actually shows that the Frontex-Cape 
Verde cooperation started already in 2006 whereas the mobility partnership was signed 
in May 2008. This shows that the Frontex-Cape Verde working arrangement was 
discussed already two years before the Commission approached Cape Verde for 
exploratory talks in December 2007 (Commission 2009: 1).  
 
What does this tell us about Frontex‘ contribution to the partnership? It tells us that 
Frontex has been able to offer both expertise and resources to the process of 
developing the partnership. Frontex started cooperating with Cape Verde before the 
Commission even launched the idea of the EU-CV mobility partnership, which tells us 
that Frontex has got a certain capacity to involve in projects on its own premises. In 
fact, the agency actually fed the border management agenda into the mobility 
partnership. This means that rather than being a result of the mobility partnership, 
Frontex it self has contributed as a central actor in the creation of the partnership (and 
more specifically border management). This shows that in relation to formulating the 
mobility partnership, Frontex has – in fact – been effective.  
 
From an organizational perspective it is interesting to investigate where 
(organizationally) and why the delay took place. The working arrangement was 
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presented for the management board for the first time in 2007 and then again in 2010. 
According to one interviewee (Interview 16 2011) all the ‗essential and important 
questions concerning Frontex‘ work are discussed and decided in the management 
board. So, did the management board cause this delay? The empirical findings do tell 
us that this is not the case. In the interviews it becomes clear that the board members 
experienced the approval of the working arrangement as a ‗normal procedure‘, not 
having caused any disagreement among the board representatives, and one of them 
states as follows:  
 
The agreement with Cape Verde followed the normal procedures. The 
agreement was not considered controversial, and everybody saw the advantages 
of the cooperation with Cape Verde 
(Interview 17 2011) 
 
Nevertheless, according to one interviewee the approval might have been delayed 
because of lack of capacity in the management board:  
 
The only reason [why the approval took time] was that the Management Board 
had overloaded agendas with priority topics such as the revision of the Frontex 
regulation, the RABIT activation in Greece, the annual work program, and 
budget establishment 
(Interview 16 2011) 
 
This statement can count for some delay in the management board; yet it is difficult to 
use this as an explanation for the general lack of implementation of the working 
arrangement. Nevertheless, this observation is interesting in the way that many 
interlocutors have made clear that other topics and issues are far more urgent and 
important than the working arrangement with Cape Verde. This might indicate that the 
non-urgent status of Frontex-Cape Verde cooperation has led to a slower 
implementation of the cooperation because other issues have been prioritized. 
Working arrangements seem to be a rather uncontroversial aspect of the management 
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board‘s work; they are considered to be in the interest of the member states and 
therefore adopted by consensus (Interview 16 2011, Interview 17 2011). If the agency 
experiences lack of time and sources, it will be natural to imagine that the most urgent 
matter will be discussed and decided upon first.  
 
Before the management board can approve the working arrangement, the Commission 
needs to approve the draft mandate and make comments on it. Informally, the 
Commission confirmed this already in August 2010 (Interview 8 2010), however by 
the time that the working arrangement was to be approved by the management board 
in November 2010, the Commission had not yet sent their approval of the working 
arrangement (Interview 16 2011). This means that the management board took a 
temporary decision without the comments from the Commission in November 2010, 
and thereafter signed the working arrangement through a so called ‗silent procedure‘ 
after they received the comments from the Commission.  
 
This seems generally to be a problem for the Frontex management board. They seem 
flexible on some issues, but at the same time one of the board members (Interview 16 
2011) express the difficulty they have in concluding topics fast enough: 
 
…we start discussing the action plan for the following year in February. Then 
we meet again to confirm the action plan in September. The Commission 
normally comments on this in December….two months after we held our 
meeting where we were supposed to discuss the inputs from the Commission. 
This is not effective. The migration routes changes too quickly. It is impossible 
to take these decisions over one year in advance… 
(Interview 16 2011) 
 
This may indicate that the delay has taken place in the agency as such, and in the 
negotiating phase of the working arrangement. Some of the interviewees have stated 
that there have not been any formal disagreements or issues in the cooperation with 
Cape Verdean authorities (Interview 10 2010; Interview 11 2010; Interview 12 2010). 
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Rather than disagreements on the content of the working arrangement it has been 
stated from several interviewees that the delay might be caused by problems of 
capacity in Cape Verde. ‗From what I know there has been some problems of internal 
organization in Cape Verde. They had some problems because there are so many 
different authorities involved in the process (Interview 12 2010).‘ Another interlocutor 
supported this account when he stated that: 
 
…there are often problems of internal coordination within the authorities 
working on the mobility partnership in Cape Verde. Once you have made an 
agreement in a meeting, you never hear anything again. When you believe that 
everything is in order, it is not in order at all, and sometimes it seems like 
information get lost between the different authorities  
(Interview 10 2010) 
 
The Cape Verdean officials confirmed that the internal coordination in Cape Verde is 
not as efficient as it could have been and they express this in the following way:  
 
Cape Verde is a country with only 35 years of Independence, and it is a state 
that is still moving forward in a recent consolidation of its institutions, whose 
financial and human resources are limited. No one can ever ask for an 
institutional performance or an administrative capacity in the same way or very 
similar to that of a Portuguese, French, or Dutch. The issue of financial and 
human limitations of a poor country like Cape Verde is therefore an important 
explanation for this delay [my translation]
16
. 
(E-mail correspondence 1 2010) 
 
                                                 
16
 Cabo Verde é um país com 35 anos de Independência, ou seja é um Estado, ainda recente que vai avançando 
na consolidação das suas instituições, cujos recursos financeiros e humanos, são limitados para a 
operacionalização. Não se poderá nunca pedir uma performance institucional/administrativa igual ou parecida 
com a de uma instituição portuguesa, francesa, ou holandesa. Impõe-se aqui também a questão das limitações 
financeiros e humanos de um país pobre como Cabo Verde. 
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According to Kamrava (2000: 2), building up bureaucratic capacity in former 
colonized countries often take place over time and gradually. This reminds us how the 
lack of resources and time can impact the implementation of policy.  
  
In addition to problems finding one main responsible interlocutor in Cape Verde, there 
have been some problems concerning translation, which may have caused the delay 
(Interview 3 2010). Without translation it has not been possible to go further in the 
negotiations concerning the working arrangement with Frontex. However, according 
to Frontex‘ sources ‗English is the prevailing language in any discussions and 
documents from Frontex‘ (E-mail correspondence 2 2010). Thus, it is not likely to 
believe that the delay is caused by complications with the Frontex translation service 
alone; yet it may have contributed to a delay of the process.  
 
These findings may suggest that internal discussions and negotiations between Frontex 
officials and Cape Verdean officials can account for the delays of approval of the 
working arrangement. One Frontex official (Interview 8 2010) confirms that the 
internal discussions have taken considerable time with Cape Verde, and that they have 
been much longer and more complicated than what has been the case of Moldova and 
Georgia.  
 
The working arrangement needs to be established in a transparent way visible for 
member states and the management board. The management board is given 
mandate to start negotiations with the third country and the negotiation happens 
in a certain pace. It takes some time before the arrangement can be concluded 
and this depends on issues on both the European and Cape Verdean side.  
(Interview 8 2010) 
 
Frontex can only be considered as one voice among many actors, and this might cause 
delays in the negotiating process as well. In front of the other actors (international 
organizations, the USA, Russia and other third countries) Frontex positions it self as a 
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coordinator, and Frontex‘ aim is to prevent overlapping and increase the dialogue. 
Nevertheless, this comes from a Frontex official: 
 
It is difficult for Frontex to find its role within the context of European border 
management. Frontex is a quite new actor, and there are many other actors 
[operating] in the field. There are various DGs launching activities in third 
countries and we see that various international organizations are working in the 
field, member states have got bilateral agendas, and in addition to this, non-EU 
countries like the bigger players USA and Australia are being active in the 
particular region.  
(Interview 8 2010) 
 
However, as mentioned above, cooperation with a third country might be launched by 
collaborating bilaterally through another member state. In the Cape Verdean case it is 
interesting to see that Spain started bilateral cooperation with countries from West 
Africa supported by Frontex already in 2006 (Interview 17 2011). This operation was 
called Operation HERA, and has been called the ‗longest FRONTEX coordinated 
operation‘ (Frontex 2010b), and included a sea operation with vessels, planes and 
patrolling of the costal areas. In the period of this operation from July 2006 until 
December 2006 18 987 illegal migrants arrived to the Canary Islands (Frontex 2010b), 
and over 6000 migrants were returned to their country of origin in this period (ibid). 
Based on bilateral cooperation with Spain, the West African countries of Mauritania, 
Senegal and Cape Verde also participated and cooperated with Frontex (Interview 17 
2011). This means that the migration pressure between West Africa and Europe was to 
a large extent satisfactorily controlled already in 2006, which than again makes it 
possible to assume that the ‗need‘ and ‗urgency‘ of formalizing and implementing the 
working arrangement with Cape Verde, outlined in the mobility partnership, is not as 
pressing than it was before. The migration routes have appeared to change, and the 
need that was there in 2006 to establish a working arrangement with Cape Verde may 
not be as urgent today as it was five years ago.  
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With Cape Verde we have not reached very far and it is clear that it takes time. 
The next phase will take time and I do not think that the case of Cape Verde has 
got a high priority. Frontex approached Cape Verde already in 2006. Spain 
launched a very good cooperation with Mauritania, Senegal and Cape Verde 
and I think that Cape Verde was higher prioritized at the time of Ceuta and 
Melilla when a lot of migrants died. That was horrible times and the conditions 
were bad. Frontex supported Spain with resources, logistics and coordination.  
(Interview 16 2011) 
 
However, the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) operations from 2010 may 
illustrate how Frontex has got the capacity and resources to intervene and share their 
competence, when needed. The RABIT operations started in 2010 as an initiative 
between Frontex and the Greek authorities as a response to the increased pressure on 
the Greek borders. The migrants arriving into Greece have traditionally originated 
from Albania, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq and Palestine, but these days more 
immigrants from the African countries have been observed, showing that the migration 
routes- normally through Spain and Italy – have changed (Terzis 2011: 22).  
 
The migratory pressure changes, it can increase and decrease and it can change 
from region to region. These are great challenges for the member states, and 
their effort to solve these issues is under constant change. What contributed to 
the RABIT intervention this autumn did not come as a surprise, and when it 
started all the resources were given to this particular operation. This operation 
started fast enough. We got the money, it went well – it was urgent.  
 (Interview 16 2011) 
 
At the time of writing, the working arrangement is approved by the management 
board, and is now waiting to be signed by the Director of Frontex and an official from 
the Cape Verdean government. Before this arrangement is concluded no direct 
operational cooperation will be started between Cape Verde and Frontex. But once this 
is agreed upon Frontex will start involving the operational border control with Cape 
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Verde, and Frontex will play an active role in the implementation of the mobility 
partnership. However, it is still too early to say when this implementation will start. 
These findings show that Frontex has been operating autonomously in the formulation 
phase of the border management aspect in the mobility partnership, and that it has 
served as an important actor in order to decrease the illegal migration between West 
Africa and Europe through the bilateral agreement with Spain.  
 
4.3 An organizational perspective 
How does Frontex contribute to the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership towards the 
overall objective of EU‘s migration management policy? The aim of this section is to 
understand the empirical findings presented above. The empirical assessment has 
showed that Frontex has contributed to the mobility partnership to a large extent by 
feeding the border management agenda into the partnership. Nevertheless, the findings 
have shown that this is only the case, so far, in the formulation- and not yet in the 
implementation phase of the partnership. However, the fact that the agency has 
participated in the formational phase is interesting as such, and also it is interesting to 
see that it has contributed through bilateral cooperation with Spain. Thus, further it 
will be interesting to discuss what has allowed Frontex to participate in such a way. 
Egeberg and Trondal (2010) argue that the EU level agencies are autonomous from the 
national structure, and that they to a large extent participate in the new executive 
formation at the EU level. In the following section I will discuss what has allowed 
Frontex to play such a role in the EU-Cape Verde partnership, and this will be 
structured on the basis of the variables presented in chapter two taken from 
organizational theory.  
 
4.3.1 Organizational structure 
Organizational size and budget 
The organizational capacity of an organization is largely connected to its size and 
budgetary capacity. A large organization would allow the staff to be more specialized 
within their specific sector and as well to have capacity and time to do their tasks. The 
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organizational capacity of Frontex, in terms of size and budget, seems to be rather 
strong. Frontex has got a total staff of approximately 270 persons. Out of these, 70 are 
national seconded experts, while 200 are permanent staff (Interview 17 2011). 
Originally, Frontex consisted of mostly seconded national experts. However, by time 
the permanent staff has got a more prominent role in the agency structure. Compared 
with other European agencies, Frontex is one of the largest, and its budgetary and staff 
capacity has increased every year since the beginning. In 2005, the total number of 
staff counted 45 persons, differentiated between 27 Seconded National Experts and 17 
permanent staff (40 percent administration, and 60 percent in operational units) 
(Frontex 2005).  
 
Frontex started with an annual budget of 3,5 million Euros in 2005 without any 
financial autonomy. At that time the Commission was responsible for their budget 
(Frontex 2005). In 2010 Frontex‘ annual budget is 85 million Euros, and they are 
responsible for their own economy. However, they are reporting to the Commission, 
and Frontex staff is responsible for approving their Annual budget together with the 
Management Board. The organizational capacity of Frontex has increased with the 
years. Thus, in 2006 when Frontex started cooperating with Cape Verde their capacity 
was not as comprehensive as today. This might indicate why Frontex at that time 
cooperated with Cape Verde through a bilateral agreement with Spain, and why they 
now has got the possibility to put forward the working arrangement. Cooperation on 
the basis of bilateral agreement is less costly and less complex than cooperating 
bilaterally. Moreover, the fact that Frontex established the bilateral arrangement might 
indicate that working arrangement was not pushed forward at an earlier stage, both 
because of capacity and because of urgence. As mentioned above, the RABIT 
operations were successfully put through in 2010, and the explanation to this may be 
that they were urgent. This shows that Frontex has got the capacity to implement. They 
have got the possibility to do this because of the increasing capacity of Frontex in 
terms of size and budget. This may give us an indication of why it has been possible to 
negotiate and start the implementing phase of the working arrangement in 2010, while 
it may have been delayed because it has not been sufficiently urgent.  
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Organizational demography 
The organizational demography is expected to influence how the individuals in the 
organization act. One of the demographical variables is ‗profession‘ and it is expected 
that the profession of the staff in an organization matter, and more specifically this is 
expected to contribute to the identity formation in the organization in the sense that the 
professional background of the officials will be of special importance when they take 
decisions.  
 
In Frontex, the interviews have showed that the professional background of the staff 
has made cooperation easier because, as the interviewees have told us: ‗police officers 
actually do understand each other‘ (Interview 16 2011). 
 
The Frontex staff has got the same professional background- how does this influence 
their work in the agency? The informants expressed, to a large extent, that their 
professional background was more important than their national or European 
affiliation in their daily work. 
 
It is easy to cooperate with officials with the same professional background. I 
understand how other policemen think and work, and they have a broad 
perspective when it comes to border management. They are all oriented on 
migratory issues and are generally oriented.  
(Interview 16 2011) 
 
This may indicate that the organizational identity in Frontex is strengthened because 
the staff are mostly from the same professional environment- this makes it easier to 
cooperate, and easier to create one specific direction for the work in the organization. 
All my informants have got background from their national police or from border 
guards in their respective country and most of them have been trained in border 
management control before they joined Frontex.  
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Through cooperation and support from the Commission, the Council and the member 
states, the staff expresses that Frontex has got the possibility to strengthen and develop 
the common EU borders. And with competences from both police and border control 
they have all together the competence and experience needed to fulfill the Frontex 
mandate. The interviewees state that their competence is divided and shared over 
Europe through the participation of national police officers from all over Europe.  
 
‗My country‘s external borders are no longer my national border. My country‘s 
external borders are all the places where persons can cross a border in order to 
reach the external borders of Europe, for instance Greece, Italy and Spain.  
(Interview 17 2011) 
 
This shows that the organizational demography in Frontex allows the agency to 
operate more autonomously and coherently across countries on border management 
related issues. This means that since Frontex is operating on behalf of the member 
states, they all together represent one external border instead of several. This makes it 
possible to have one policy objective for all the countries participating, and thus 
possible to feed the policy agenda of border management into the mobility partnership. 
 
Primary/secondary structure 
Officials work in Frontex on a fulltime basis and hold the agency as their primary 
structure. According to theory, this leads us to expect that their identity as police 
officers will be strengthened. Theory tells us that whether an organizational entity is 
primary or secondary influences the actor‘s way of thinking and their identity, and the 
fact that Frontex serves as a primary structure makes the officials working in Frontex 
more connected to the organization, and thus more connected to the European level. 
This can be seen as enhancing the organizational capacity of Frontex, and we even see 
that the seconded national experts feel that their role as border management experts is 
more important than their national background. This can be demonstrated by the 
statement from this Frontex official:  
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My role in Frontex is mainly as an expert [on border management]. I have built 
my expertise in the organization over time and have to a large extent been able 
to influence the activity in Frontex. The seconded national experts in Frontex 
have traditionally been as important in the organization as the permanent staff.  
(Interview 17 2011) 
 
This shows that the seconded national experts are to a large degree participating on the 
same basis as the permanent staff, which may indicate that the organizational capacity 
and autonomy of the agency is enhanced. The task of the seconded national expert is to 
‗make sure that updated information from the daily border control service is always 
updated within Frontex. This is why they normally are working in Frontex for two to 
four years‘ (Interview 17 2011). In the beginning, Frontex was mainly composed of 
seconded national experts, paid by their national governments and police service, 
while Frontex- with time- has evolved has an organization with more and more 
permanent staff.  
 
In the beginning the national experts had the same role and the same tasks as 
the permanent staff. However, with time this has changed. Now, the national 
experts serve to a large extent as a support to the permanent staff, even though 
each person‘s specific competence and expertise is more important than their 
position as seconded national expert or permanent staff  
(Interview 17 2011) 
 
Professional identity is the most important question in this regard. The national 
seconded experts do feel that their loyalty is mostly related to their expertise as a 
police officer, however, they do know that they are paid by their national police and 
that this is their original affiliation. The findings show that their affiliation as an expert 
is more important in their organizational environment than their role as a national 
expert or permanent staff. The national seconded experts are located in Warsaw and 
work there on full time, on the same basis as the permanent staff. The interviewees 
confirm this by stating that the affiliation of the seconded national experts is mainly 
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with Frontex and that they feel more like experts on border management than national 
seconded experts.  
 
The European level is the most important level in Frontex‘ daily work, but as 
well I feel like there is no particular disagreement between my country‘s 
participation in Frontex and Frontex ideas. Our common goal is to cooperate on 
border management, and that cooperation is mostly based on consensus  
(Interview 17 2011) 
 
However, for the members of the management board the pattern is rather different. 
The management board members participate in the board on the basis of their national 
affiliation, and the board is their secondary structure. However, my interviewees 
express that they feel as experts in this field rather as representatives for a particular 
country when participating in the board meetings. It is also claimed that this is what 
dominates the discussions in the management board- how to improve the common 
objective of border management, rather than how to improve the border management 
in one specific country. The decisions in the management board are also, to a large 
extent, taken on the basis of consensus.  
 
This strong trend over time, that the seconded national experts are given autonomy and 
are treated as equals with the permanent staff, may be used as an indicator for why 
Frontex has been able to contribute significantly in the border management in Europe, 
and especially since Frontex used to be composed of seconded national experts. In 
2006 when Frontex started to cooperate bilaterally with Spain most of the staff 
working in the organization was seconded national experts. Because of this it may be 
reasonable to believe that since they felt as an important part of the organization the 
organizational capacity of the organization increased as well, making Frontex efficient 
and autonomous and allowing Frontex to involve in bilateral projects such as the 
HERA operations even though findings may have indicated that their resources were 
more limited at that time.   
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When asking both the permanent staff and the seconded national experts on the task of 
Frontex, they say that the task of Frontex is to make sure that the management of the 
external borders is coordinated between the participating member states. As well, they 
highlight the task that Frontex have on developing a common standard at the European 
level instead of several different standards all along Europe.  
 
That Frontex actually fed the policy agenda into the EU-Cape Verde mobility 
partnership contributing to the formulation of the partnership is interesting. Whereas 
the original assumption was that the mobility partnership contributed to the 
development of the working arrangement, this study shows that Frontex‘ cooperation 
with Cape Verde started ahead of the partnership. 
 
if there was a gap between the complete overview in the scoreboard and the 
work of Frontex…let‘s say…if the Frontex activities would not be listed in 
there then we would not sit around the table to match how our ideas and the 
knowledge on what we have on the needs of a particular country to match it 
with all proposed activities which are brought in by the member states. That‘s 
why we decided to take part in the mobility partnership when we were invited 
by the Commission. Most and for all it is first a Frontex activity. We are not, 
let‘s say... I do not know how to explain this. It could happen that the 
Commission is offering the mobility partnership to particular countries where 
third countries have no cooperation with Frontex, but we would not go and 
operate with a particular third country because the Commission launches a 
mobility partnership. But until now it has matched with Moldova, Georgia and 
Cape Verde. And with Cape Verde we were already negotiating before the 
mobility partnership was launched. 
(Interview 8 2010) 
 
This shows us that the policy officers working with the mobility partnership did not 
take the initiative to include border management into the partnership. The cooperation 
between Frontex and the third country was actually established before the mobility 
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partnership, thus it is more reasonable to believe that Frontex it self introduced the 
border management aspect into the partnership. As we have seen above, the reason for 
why this may have been possible can be accounted for through an organizational 
perspective. The organizational capacity of the EU-level agency in terms of budget 
and size has increased since the start in 2005, the professional background of the staff 
is enhancing the capacity of the organization because they work well together. The fact 
that Frontex is their primary structure strengthen the capacity of the organization and 
enhance their possibility to act as an EU-level agency in order to enhance the 
coordination of the member states participating in the European border management. 
This may indicate that Frontex is taking part in the executive formation at the EU-level 
creating a supranational identity enhancing the organizational capacity of the agency.  
 
4.4 Summary 
The aim of the chapter has been to assess, empirically, how Frontex contribute to the 
EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership. The initial expectation was that Frontex was to 
participate in the implementation of the partnership, and by this making the mobility 
partnership more focused on border management, even through the partnership has 
been promoted as a facilitator of circular migration and migration management nexus.  
  
The empirical findings show that the working arrangement with Frontex has not yet 
been implemented. However, they show that Frontex has contributed significantly to 
the formulation of the partnership, and that it has, in fact, added the border 
management agenda to the partnership. Why is this it? The empirical findings tell that 
Frontex cooperated with Cape Verde through the bilateral agreement with Spain 
already in 2006. These agreements may have contributed to a control of the migratory 
flows between West Africa and the European continent, making the need to implement 
the CV-Frontex working arrangement less urgent.  
 
Earlier studies on EU-level agencies and organizational theory have thus been used in 
order to conceive how and why the Cape Verde-Frontex cooperation and the Frontex 
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participation in the partnership have progressed in this particular way. The 
independent variables of organizational structure, organizational demography and 
organizational size and budget and primary/secondary structure can give us an 
indication of the organizational capacity of Frontex and thus indicate how Frontex has 
been able to negotiate with Cape Verde and feed the border management agenda into 
the partnership.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Concluding remarks 
5.1 Introduction 
The European political order is under constant change and transformation. The 
development of common platforms for cooperation and the development of institutions 
represent, to a large extent, solutions to shared problems within this order (Olsen 
2002). Institutions are in constant development by assessing the objectives, designing 
the institution and being used as an instrument to achieve policy (Olsen 2002). In this 
study this is exemplified by the EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership. The dependent 
variable in the thesis is the EU migration management policy, operationalized by 
coordination. The starting point is the analytical claim that ‗institutions matters‘, and 
crucial for the analysis has been to investigate how a process of institutionalization – 
the mobility partnership – can contribute to a change of the EU migration management 
policy. In order to investigate this more in detail, the EU-level agency Frontex has 
been brought in to the study. This has made it possible to investigate the contribution 
of the border management in the mobility partnership, and to what extent Frontex has 
contributed to the evolution of the EU-Cape Verde partnership.  
 
I started out asking whether the partnership contributes to a change of the overall 
migration management policy, and accordingly showed that the EU-Cape Verde 
mobility partnership has contributed to the overall migration management policy in the 
sense of coordination between the EU member states, the Commission and Frontex. 
Furthermore, we have seen that Frontex‘ participation has contributed by feeding the 
border management agenda into the mobility partnership. Frontex has not contributed, 
as originally expected, in the implementation, but rather in the formulation of the EU-
CV partnership. These two findings may show that the coordination of the EU 
migration management has changed with the establishment of the mobility partnership 
because, as seen in the analyses, we see a difference in the cooperation between the 
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member states and the European institutions. Patterns of cooperation that were not 
there earlier are now present.  
 
In this chapter I will first present the findings concerning how Frontex contributes to 
the partnership followed by a presentation of the findings concerning how the mobility 
partnership contributes to a change of the overall migration management policy and 
relate this to dynamics in the EU migration policy. Next, I will widen the debate by 
discussing the choice of theory and suggest how other theoretical approaches could 
have contributed to the study. Finally, I will place this thesis in a broader context: in 
what way does it contribute to the studies on European migration management and the 
European integration process, and how may this be studied further? 
 
5.2 Main findings 
Originally, one would expect an EU-level agency to be more influential on the 
implementation of policy than the formulation of policy (Trondal and Egeberg 2010) 
however, the findings from this study show that Frontex, up until now, has contributed 
in the formulation rather than the implementation phase of the partnership. After 
studying the timeline it has been demonstrated that Frontex has a strong role in the 
preparatory stages of the partnership, but it has not yet been able to implement what 
has been outlined in the Joint Declaration.  
 
The reason for including Frontex in the study has been to investigate how Frontex 
contributes to the mobility partnership towards the overall objective of EU‘s migration 
management policy. Since the main purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the 
coordination of the EU migration management policy, the study of Frontex has 
contributed to understand the coordination of the EU migration management in a 
broader context and within the aspect of border management. The hypothesis was 
developed from an organizational perspective and the expectations were that Frontex, 
because of its organizational structure would lead to a more efficient border 
management policy within the framework of the partnership. Since Frontex is assigned 
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with border management in the mobility partnership we would expect the mobility 
partnership to be enhancing the coordination of the border management in the EU.  
 
The main findings show that Frontex has contributed to the EU-Cape Verde mobility 
partnership. More specifically, since Frontex started to negotiate with Cape Verde over 
two years before the partnership was established, Frontex has contributed by feeding 
the border management agenda into the mobility partnership. However, the 
formulation of the working arrangement has not yet led to any implementation. 
Because of its organizational capacity, Frontex has – prior to the mobility partnership 
– been able to participate in bilateral agreements with Spain. Through the HERA 
operation Frontex contributed with resources and coordination to the operation, which 
may have contributed to decrease the migratory pressure between West Africa and 
Europe. This may have contributed to make the working arrangement with Cape Verde 
less urgent, and might imply why it has not yet been implemented. At that time, the 
capacity of Frontex, in terms of budget and staff was modest compared with today, 
which may indicate why they contributed in a bilateral agreement rather than focusing 
on the working arrangement with Frontex. Yet, lack of organizational capacity in 
Frontex is not the reason why the working arrangement has not been implemented, 
which may be illustrated by the RABIT operation in Greece where Frontex relocated 
resources and contributed significantly. Organizational theory has been helpful in 
order to account for the contribution of Frontex in the partnership, and has been used 
more specifically to illustrate how organizational capacity can give an EU-level 
agency ‗action capacity‘. The idea of bounded rationality is important in this regard, 
because this is what gives the actors a certain action capacity based on the 
organizational structure of the organization.  
 
We have seen that Frontex contributes, then what have been found by studying the 
EU-Cape Verde partnership? This thesis started out with the desire to recognize to 
what extent EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership contributed to a change to the overall 
management policy in the EU, and it found out that the mobility partnership may have 
contributed to change the overall migration management policy in the EU. With the 
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EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership features of a common policy through the process 
of institutionalization of the partnership can be seen. Institutionalization is recognized 
by the development of rules, standard operating procedures and a shared understanding 
of legitimate resources. Through the patterns of cooperation and patterns of interaction 
established with the partnership it is possible to discern the establishment of these 
features. As initially expected, the mobility partnership has provided the participating 
member states and institutions with a common set of shared language which have 
made the migration cooperation more holistic and effective. First of all, the findings 
show the symbolic value of the EU-Cape Verde partnership. The mobility partnership 
is not initiating migration projects, but can rather be seen as a way of structuring the 
migration management policy in a new way. From the interviews it has been possible 
to understand how rules have been infused into the daily work of the officials working 
within the partnership, and how they now perceive this as legitimate and evident. 
Second, the mobility partnership has enhanced the cooperation between the 
participating member states by introducing standard operating procedures contributing 
to the institutionalization of the EU-Cape Verde partnership. The work of the DG JLS, 
specifically through the development of the scoreboard and by organizing a common 
task force for discussing the mobility partnership, can be seen as value-added and 
contributes to an efficient and more holistic migration management policy.  
 
It has been claimed that the partnerships are not a new instrument in the EU migration 
policy. This may be correct in the sense that they are not introducing new migration 
projects, but they are new in the sense that they are contributing to the coordination of 
the EU migration management policy. By introducing new patterns of cooperation and 
new patterns of interaction between the participating member states, the EU-level 
agencies and institutions and the Cape Verdean partner country are working together 
under new premises. This may indicate that the partnerships contribute to change the 
EU migration management policy identified as features of coordination that did not 
exist earlier.  
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5.3 Dynamics in the EU migration management policy 
and theoretical implications 
The aim of using institutional theory is to supplement rather than to reject alternative 
theoretical approaches (March and Olsen 2006: 20). The choice of applying 
institutional and organizational theory in this study is not an attempt to state that 
institutional theory is the only way to investigate the recent developments of the EU 
migration management policy, but these approaches are considered to be of 
importance in order to understand political processes and developments in the political 
system. They make it possible to study how a political process is undergoing changes 
on a micro level by unpacking ‗the structures embedded in the principles of 
organization (Trondal et al. 2010: 24). This study has allowed investigating dynamics 
in the recent EU migration management policy. The migration management policy in 
the EU is flexible, and the nature of the migration policy is complex. Notwithstanding, 
when working on the mobility partnership and Frontex it has also been recognized that 
the dynamics underpinning the migration management policy are various, and that the 
mobility partnership is indeed a hybrid.  
 
The mobility partnership is coordinated at a European level, yet the legal aspect of the 
partnership is confined to the national level. The migration projects are launched by 
the member states, and the partnerships are not under the legislation of the ECJ. 
Frontex serves as a coordinator and contributes with resources to the EU border 
management, but the specific operations are undertaken by the member states 
themselves. In it self, the partnership is contributing to a higher level of coordination at 
the EU level, however this does only include the five member states participating. 
Other EU member states outside the framework of partnership are not included, and 
the partnership is not a part of the Acquis communautaire
17
. This may demonstrate the 
special nature of the partnership. Recent developments have shown that the EU 
migration management policy is increasingly becoming an issue of EU competence. 
                                                 
17
 The Acquis communautaire refers to the common EU policy based on laws, principles, duties and goals within 
the European Union (Lie 2007: 9) 
88 
 
Yet, the mobility partnership is not a supranational policy instrument. The Schengen 
treaty allows free movements of persons within the borders of the participating 
countries. This means that Cape Verdeans allowed into the Schengen area through the 
mobility partnership will move freely to countries that are not participating. This 
means that the partnership influences every country in the Union, steered by only five 
member states. Thus, the mobility partnership is a hybrid and a unique cooperation 
within the EU migration management policy. Institutional and organizational theories 
have allowed looking at developments within these structures and how the mobility 
partnership and Frontex contribute to the supranational coordination of the EU 
migration management policy. However, these observations might demonstrate that an 
intergovernmental approach could have been helpful in order to understand the recent 
dynamics in the EU migration management policy. Liberal-intergovernmentalism is 
one of the leading approaches in the study of European integration. Its main argument 
is that developments in the European integration are driven by rational choices and 
national interests in the member states (Moravcsik 1998). This theory would have 
opened the opportunity to investigate more detailed to what extent the recent 
developments of coordination in the EU migration management through the mobility 
partnership are results of the institutions in which these features have been developed 
or results of serving the interests of the member states. It could have broadened the 
debate by encouraging to study the hybrid aspect of the partnership between the 
supranational and intergovernmental. This could have invited this study to participate, 
to a larger extent, in the debate concerning dynamics in the European integration.  
 
This section also deserves some comments on how institutional and organizational 
theory is applied in the thesis. When using institutional theory to study political 
outcomes there is often directed attention to change and continuity, together with a 
focus of the inertia of institutions (Peters 1999). This study does not investigate, nor 
continue the debate concerning the inertia of institutions. It seeks to investigate the 
birth of an institution, and it has tried to assess the blossom and the first paths in this 
development. In addition, it is important to make a remark on the way organizational 
theory is used in order to investigate how Frontex contribute to the partnership. The 
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aim of this study has not been to study EU-level agencies nor the executive branch of 
the EU administrative order as such. These studies often deal with the autonomy of the 
EU-level agency, how the agencies are coupled with the national administration or the 
European administrative order. In this study it has rather been chosen to investigate the 
contribution of Frontex empirically. Then organizational theory and studies on EU-
level agencies have been used in order to discern and understand how and why Frontex 
has contributed to the partnership in such a way. The organizational theory has 
allowed developing hypotheses on what to expect, and the empirical assessment in the 
light of the organizational theory has made it possible to confirm or reject these 
hypotheses. The institutional and organizational approach has allowed me to 
investigate changes in the EU migration policy and to reveal how the mobility 
partnership has contributed to the aim of more coordination through a process of 
institutionalization, which responds to my initial question on how the mobility 
partnership contributes to the EU migration management policy. 
 
5.4 External validity and further research 
This thesis had the overall scope to fill some of the gaps in the research on the 
mobility partnerships and Frontex. As mentioned in chapter one, the mobility 
partnership is understudied, specifically due to its recent creation and appearance in 
the EU migration management policy. The prominent task of border management in 
the mobility partnership and more specifically Frontex has not, at the time of writing, 
been studied. This has made it even more rewarding to unpack the contribution of 
Frontex to the mobility partnership and has made it possible to apprehend 
developments that are crucial in the relationship between Cape Verde and Europe. 
However, what inferences can be drawn from this case study? A single case study does 
not give the possibility to draw generalizable conclusions (George and Bennett 2005), 
so how can this study contribute to the research on European integration and migration 
policy? This case study is an in-depth study of one specific partnership, and the 
findings can therefore be used in order to understand parts of the developments of the 
EU migration policy. This study may therefore be useful in later studies on these 
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topics, in so called building-block studies. This case study does not, nor does political 
science in general, make it possible to give an answer to how the mobility partnership 
and Frontex will develop in the future. However, this study has allowed me to open the 
black box of the relationship between Frontex and the mobility partnership. Moreover, 
further studies may be used in order to extract the remaining items in the black box 
and investigate them in the same context in order to broaden up the study of the recent 
dynamics in the EU migration management policy.  
 
I have now stated that findings from this study are limited because of the nature of 
single case studies, but this understudied topic deserves indeed to be elaborated further 
in future research projects. First, I would encourage continuing this study by involving 
the two other cases of Moldova and Georgia. By comparing cases it would be possible 
to investigate where this cooperation works well and where it works less well, as well 
as strengthening the findings from this particular EU-Cape Verde case study. This 
would enhance the possibility to generalize over the findings from the case study. 
Since these cases are different in the sense that Moldova and Georgia represent two 
potential member states to the European Union, and Cape Verde is not, it would be 
possible to compare cases and get extended knowledge on the partnerships as such, 
and the recent trends in the EU migration management policy. Hence, applying the 
theoretical framework used in this thesis to a larger population would be fruitful in 
order to improve the external validity of the study. Since this study does not allow 
investigating further the supranational versus intergovernmental features it would be 
interesting to do this in a future study. This study has indicated that the mobility 
partnership is representing a change of the recent developments by being a hybrid 
between the supranational coordination and an intergovernmental cooperation whilst 
the recent developments in the migration management policy have supranational 
features. Second, an interesting study would be to follow up on the mobility 
partnership with Cape Verde and Frontex. Frontex was seen as interesting since it has 
been criticized for violating human rights and creating a ‗Fortress of Europe‘. This 
study has found that Frontex is serving as a coordinator and provides resources to the 
member states in terms of border management. However, the contribution of Frontex 
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to the partnership is still only in the formulating phase. When the cooperation between 
Frontex and Cape Verde becomes implemented, it would be interesting to investigate 
the results of the implementation further. How does the implementation of the working 
arrangement on the ground contribute to the involvement of border management in the 
mobility partnership, and how does this, if at all, contribute to change the reality of the 
migrants emigrating from, and passing through the Cape Verdean islands? In this 
context it would have been valuable to conduct in-depth interviews with Cape Verdean 
officials as well. This study has to a large extent built on information from a European 
perspective, thus in future studies it would have been crucial to include the Cape 
Verdean perspective. Hence, it would have been interesting to investigate differences 
in the European and the Cape Verdean approach to the value-added of the mobility 
partnership, if any.  
 
This study has investigated the very beginning of the mobility partnership, with the 
overall aim of exploring recent developments in the EU migration management policy. 
It remains to see how the mobility partnership will evolve over time, because 
‗surviving institutions are those that have proved their worth through the test of time‘ 
(Olsen 2009: 6), and only ‗through the test of time‘ it will be possible to advocate how 
the partnership contributes to change the overall migration management policy. Only 
time will tell how this emerging institutionalization of the mobility partnership will be 
maintained. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Guide no. 1: The Commission, Permanent Representations, the 
Council  
 
(1) Personal information 
a. Position 
b. Policy field 
c. Description of work 
 
(2) The EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership 
a. How do you perceive your role in the mobility partnership 
b. How do you understand this policy instrument? Main purpose, impact on 
EU migration management policy, impact on the member states etc. 
c. Do you see any difference before and after the mobility partnership? 
i. More efficient, more coordination, best practices, resources?  
d. How do you understand the motivation for creating the EU-Cape Verde 
mobility partnership?  
 
(3) The role of your country/institution in the EU-Cape Verde partnership 
a. How do you understand the task of your country/institution within the 
framework of the partnership? 
b. Why did you choose to participate? Main motivation 
c. Do you see any impacts? 
 
(4) EU-level institutions 
a. Are you in contact with institutions in the EU? When, how? 
b. Has the contact changed with the establishment of the EU-Cape Verde 
partnership? 
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(5)Frontex 
a. How do you understand that Frontex is participating in the EU-Cape 
Verde partnership 
b. Does Frontex‘ participation makes any difference?
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Appendix B 
 
Interview Guide no. 2 Frontex officals (Frontex officials, seconded national 
experts, board members)  
 
(1) Personal information 
a. Position –since when?  
b. Policy field 
c. Description of work 
(2) How would you describe the main tasks of Frontex? 
 
(3) How and to what extent do you believe that Frontex may influence the 
European border management?  
 
(4) Description of Frontex’ work in practice 
a. Uniforms, operations, separation of tasks in various organizational units 
etc.  
(5) Contact with other European institutions?  
a. Often? Which institutions?  
(6) Contact and cooperation with third countries?  
a. Development of the working arrangements 
b. Negotiation of working arrangement 
(7) The EU-Cape Verde mobility partnership 
a. What is the role of Frontex 
b. How do Frontex contribute thus far 
c. What is planned? 
d. Relationship between the Annex in the Joint Declaration and the 
participation thus far 
e. What has been easy, what has been difficult?  
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(8) Identity 
a. National versus European identity? 
b. Expert versus national expert? 
c. Identity in the organization? 
(9) Capacity 
a. Budget 
b. Resources 
c. Size 
(10) Management board  
a. Description of a standard meeting: time, topics, discussions 
b. How are the various cases presented?  
c. Consensus, votation? 
d. How do you prepare?  
e. How do you perceive the meetings? Effective? Well prepared? 
Discussion?  
f. Identity: national or European?  
g. Expert on border management or national representative?  
h. How do the Commission members participate? 
i. Difference between the MB decisions and the agency‘s decisions? 
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